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HERDING CATS: GOVERNING DISTRIBUTED 
INNOVATION* 
ALBERT C. LIN** 
Do-It-Yourself biology, 3D printing, and the sharing economy 
are equipping ordinary people with new powers to shape their 
biological, physical, and social environments. This phenomenon 
of distributed innovation is yielding new goods and services, 
greater economic productivity, and new opportunities for 
fulfillment. Distributed innovation also brings new 
environmental, health, and security risks that demand oversight, 
yet conventional government regulation may be poorly suited to 
address these risks. Dispersed and dynamic, distributed 
innovation requires the development of more flexible tools for 
oversight and government collaboration with private partners in 
governance. 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 946 
I.  THREE EXAMPLES OF DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION ................ 948 
A.  DIYbio .................................................................................... 949 
B.  3D Printing ............................................................................. 953 
C.  The Sharing Economy ........................................................... 957 
II.  CHALLENGES THAT DISTRIBUTED-INNOVATION 
TECHNOLOGIES POSE FOR REGULATORS ................................ 960 
A.  Law’s Categorical Nature ...................................................... 961 
B.  Barriers to Applying Law ..................................................... 963 
III.  INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ........ 965 
A.  Recognizing the Role of Individual Behavior in United 
States Environmental Law .................................................... 966 
B.  Options for Governing Individual Behavior....................... 969 
1.  Direct Regulation ............................................................. 969 
 
 *  © 2018 Albert C. Lin. 
 **  Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Thanks to 
Tseming Yang and participants at the Second Annual Sustainability Conference of 
American Legal Educators, as well as the editors at the North Carolina Law Review, for 
helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Dean Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean Madhavi 
Sunder, and the U.C. Davis School of Law for supporting this project, and to Victoria 
Bogdan Tejeda, Kelly Healy, and Amanda Saunders for their invaluable research 
assistance. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018) 
946 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
2.  Economic Incentives ........................................................ 971 
3.  General Permits ................................................................ 972 
4.  Upstream Regulation ....................................................... 974 
5.  Activating or Shaping Norms .......................................... 975 
6.  Technological Management ............................................ 977 
C.  Governance of Small-Scale Activities in Developing 
Countries ................................................................................ 978 
IV.  GOVERNING DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION ................................ 980 
A.  The Further Complexity of Governing Distributed 
Innovation .............................................................................. 980 
B.  Three Basic Approaches ....................................................... 983 
1.  Big Data/Big Government .............................................. 984 
2.  Nongovernmental Intermediaries .................................. 985 
3.  Self-Regulation ................................................................. 987 
V.  GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION .... 989 
A.  DIYbio .................................................................................... 990 
1.  The Current Approach: Primarily Self-Regulation ...... 990 
2.  Applying Big Data/Big Government and 
Nongovernment Intermediary Approaches to 
DIYbio .............................................................................. 995 
B.  3D Printing ........................................................................... 1000 
1.  A Potential Big Data/Big Government Approach ..... 1000 
2.  Nongovernmental Intermediaries ................................ 1002 
3.  Self-Regulation ............................................................... 1003 
  C.  Sharing Economy ................................................................ 1004 
1.  Experimenting with a Big Data/Big Government 
Approach ........................................................................ 1004 
2.  A Governance Role for Nongovernmental 
Intermediaries ................................................................ 1007 




Various technological advances are equipping ordinary people 
with new powers to shape their biological, physical, and social 
environments. Do-It-Yourself biology (“DIYbio”) offers amateur 
biotechnologists the chance to design new organisms. 3D printing 
enables individuals to design and manufacture a confounding array of 
objects. The sharing economy—and the technological changes behind 
it—facilitate constant innovation in providing goods, services, and 
information outside of traditional managerial hierarchies. On top of 
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these advances, the internet enables rapid and widespread diffusion 
of each of these technologies. DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing 
economy are examples of “distributed technologies”: technologies in 
which a wide range of users may participate in the innovation process. 
Distributed technologies are transforming how we live and interact, 
dispersing the innovation process, and giving individuals the power to 
invent, produce, and disseminate. 
The resulting changes can give rise to new products and services 
and new means of production. They may also offer environmental 
benefits by increasing efficiency or reducing waste. At the same time, 
distributed-innovation activities can generate new risks of chemical 
exposure or environmental release. Distributed-innovation activities 
may also circumvent legal protections or involve deliberate misuse. 
Normally, command-and-control regulation, market-based 
mechanisms, or other regulatory techniques could be applied to 
manage health and environmental risks. Distributed-innovation 
practices, however, often lie outside the ambit of these methods as 
currently deployed. In many instances it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply conventional risk management to distributed-
innovation activities because of their dispersed and dynamic nature. 
Such difficulty raises questions regarding government’s ability to 
modify its methods or adopt new regulatory approaches in response. 
Society may need to look beyond regulation for tools to help manage 
risks. 
Scholarship that considers environmentally harmful individual 
behavior provides a useful starting point for thinking about how to 
manage the risks of distributed innovation. Tactics to influence 
individual behavior, however, may not apply directly to distributed 
innovation. Distributed innovation involves extremely rapid change, 
unpredictable systems, and highly uncertain effects. This Article 
explains how distributed innovation poses an increasingly important 
challenge for regulators and then identifies potential mechanisms for 
managing its risks. 
Part I of the Article introduces three examples of distributed 
innovation—DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing economy—and 
describes associated concerns that may warrant oversight. While these 
examples build on different technological advances, they are all 
characterized by decentralized problem solving, participation by 
dispersed actors, and dynamic change. Part II explores the challenges 
that distributed innovation poses for conventional regulatory 
techniques. Distributed innovation looks quite different from the 
concentrated industrial or commercial activities typically governed by 
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the regulatory state. For insights into responding to the challenges 
posed by distributed innovation, Part III turns to prior and existing 
efforts to address environmental harms resulting from small-scale or 
individual behavior. Building on these insights, Part IV returns to the 
challenges posed by distributed innovation and suggests a paradigm 
for organizing options for governance. Specifically, distributed-
innovation governance might take one of three general approaches: 
(1) a “Big Data/Big Government” approach; (2) an approach that 
relies heavily on nongovernmental intermediaries for oversight; and 
(3) a self-regulatory approach. Yet no single approach offers a 
complete response to distributed innovation’s risks. Part V explores 
how society might apply these various approaches to DIYbio, 3D 
printing, and the sharing economy. Ultimately, each approach may 
have a distinct role to play in the governance of different fields of 
distributed innovation. 
I.  THREE EXAMPLES OF DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION 
Distributed innovation describes processes in which “users of 
products and services—both firms and individual consumers—are 
increasingly able to innovate for themselves.”1 Such a system is 
“characterized by decentralized problem solving, self-selected 
participation, self-organizing coordination and collaboration, ‘free’ 
revealing of knowledge, and hybrid organizational models that blend 
community with commercial success.”2 Several of distributed 
innovation’s features—decentralization, wide dissemination, and 
collaborative work—promise to spur creativity and bring about 
transformative change. At the same time, distributed innovation 
breaks with conventional models of economic activity and 
assumptions regarding risk generation, raising new challenges for 
regulators. This Part considers three examples of distributed 
innovation: DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing economy. In each 
 
 1. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005) (describing 
distributed innovation as innovation that is “democratized”). Jennifer Snow uses a similar 
term, “Radical Leveling Technology,” to refer to disruptive technologies that can be 
diffused over the internet and require minimal infrastructure or investment. Jennifer J. 
Snow, Entering the Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies, 
at 3 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47874/15Dec_Snow_Jennifer.pdf?sequence=3
&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/US6G-A6SU]. 
 2. Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of Distributed Innovation, 2 
INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 97, 98 (2007). 
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instance, diminishing entry barriers to cutting-edge technologies have 
enabled more and more people to engage in the innovation process.3 
A. DIYbio 
DIYbio refers to biotechnology research conducted by scientists 
and non-scientists outside of traditional academic and industrial 
institutions.4 This research is often aimed at encouraging 
collaboration and experimentation without specialists providing 
direct assistance.5 DIYbio experiments might take place in 
community labs (dedicated labs with pooled resources where people 
collaborate on science projects) or private homes.6 Setting up a 
DIYbio lab in one’s garage might cost a few thousand dollars, or less 
if one uses secondhand or improvised equipment.7 Community labs, 
an increasingly popular DIYbio venue, offer classes, sharing of 
expertise, and access to more powerful equipment at a lower per 
capita cost.8 The shrinking of economic, institutional, and educational 
barriers to entry has broadened participation in biotechnology 
research, a realm that previously required technical expertise and 
expensive equipment.9 The core premise of DIYbio, consistent with 
the citizen science movement of which it is a part, is that amateurs 
should enjoy the freedom to learn basic biotechnology techniques and 
 
 3. See Andrew D. Maynard, Why We Need Risk Innovation, 10 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 730, 730–31 (2015). 
 4. See DANIEL GRUSHKIN, TODD KUIKEN & PIERS MILLET, WILSON CTR., SEVEN 
MYTHS & REALITIES ABOUT DO-IT-YOURSELF BIOLOGY 4 (2013). This Article uses the 
term “DIYbio” to refer generally to biotechnology research conducted outside of 
traditional academic and industrial institutions. DIYbio.org is the largest organization 
engaged in such activity. Catherine Jefferson, The Growth of Amateur Biology: A Dual 
Use Governance Challenge? 3 (Biochemical Security 2030 Project, Policy Paper 3, 2013), 
https://biochemsec2030dotorg.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/jefferson-policy-paper-3-for-print.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/457D-TN5J]; see also An Institution for the Do-It-Yourself Biologist, 
DIYBIO, https://diybio.org/ [https://perma.cc/A9C4-WSX4]. 
 5. Thomas Landrain et al., Do-It-Yourself Biology: Challenges and Promises for an 
Open Science and Technology Movement, 7 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 115, 116 (2013).  
 6. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
 7. See Heidi Ledford, Life Hackers, 467 NATURE 650, 651 (2010). 
 8. See id.; see also GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5, 9 (reporting survey results 
finding that most DIYbio practitioners work in group spaces and that just eight percent of 
“respondents[] work[ed] exclusively in home labs”); Ellen Jorgensen, Opinion, How DIY 
Bio-Hackers Are Changing the Conversation Around Genetic Engineering, WASH. POST 
(May 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/05/20/how-diy-
bio-hackers-are-changing-the-conversation-around-genetic-engineering/ [https://perma.cc
/WM6H-37MK (dark archive)] (reporting the existence of nearly thirty community labs). 
 9. See Sarah Kellogg, The Rise of DIY Scientists: Is It Time for Regulation?, WASH. 
LAW, May 2012, at 21, 22. 
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then use those techniques to experiment, tinker with DNA, and 
develop new organisms.10 
DIYbio capitalizes on the rapidly advancing techniques of 
synthetic biology, which aims to design novel genetic sequences and 
biological systems. In contrast to conventional genetic engineering, 
which transplants existing genes for a desired trait from one species 
into the genome of another species, synthetic biology involves the 
writing of new genetic sequences and potentially the creation of new 
species.11 Drawing on the tools and methodologies of molecular 
biology, computer engineering, mathematics, and other disciplines, 
synthetic biologists view genetic sequences as combinable and 
reusable parts that can be assembled to create new functionalities or 
new organisms.12 Although DNA sequencing and synthesizing 
technologies have advanced rapidly in recent years, synthetic 
biologists still face difficult challenges in understanding what different 
genetic sequences do and how they will act when put together.13 
Nonetheless, synthetic biologists are proving increasingly adept at 
generating clusters of genes that can be inserted into existing species 
using conventional techniques.14 Moreover, the discovery of new tools 
is enabling faster and more accurate gene manipulation. CRISPR-
Cas9, a recently developed gene-editing technique, has sparked 
especially strong interest because of its speed, efficiency, and low 
cost.15 
 
 10. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
 11. Josie Garthwaite, Beyond GMOs: The Rise of Synthetic Biology, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/beyond-gmos-the-rise-of
-synthetic-biology/380770/ [https://perma.cc/P8EL-XK9Y]. 
 12. See Roberta Kwok, Five Hard Truths for Synthetic Biology, 463 NATURE 288, 288 
(2010). 
 13. See id. at 288–89; see also Catherine Jefferson, Filippa Lentzos & Claire Marris, 
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the “Myths,” FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, 
Aug. 21, 2014, at 1, 8 https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full 
[perma.cc/VS4P-3K6U] (discussing challenges involved in assembling gene-length 
fragments and producing desired gene expression). 
 14. Garthwaite, supra note 11. 
 15. See Heidi Ledford, Biohackers Gear Up for Genome Editing, 524 NATURE 398, 
398 (2015) [hereinafter Ledford, Biohackers] (reporting biohacker’s characterization of 
CRISPR as “the most amazing tool ever”); see also Henry T. Greely, Take Care!, in 
Patrick Skerrett, Is Do-It-Yourself CRISPR as Scary as it Sounds?, STAT (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/14/crispr-do-it-yourself/ [https://perma.cc/U8WF-ATJR] 
(contending that “CRISPR is revolutionizing genetics” and that “[i]n theory, anyone can 
use CRISPR to modify the genes of any living organism”); Ellen Jorgensen, DIY 
Community Can Do Interesting, Useful, Perfectly Respectable Things with CRISPR, in 
Skerrett, supra (describing intense interest in CRISPR within the DIYbio community, 
including among bioentrepreneurs and artists). See generally Heidi Ledford, CRISPR, the 
Disruptor, 522 NATURE 20 (2015) (“CRISPR is causing a major upheaval in biomedical 
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For DIYbio, the tools, standardization, and modularization of 
synthetic biology allow a wide range of non-experts to participate in 
biotechnological innovation.16 Many DIY biologists engage in 
rudimentary experiments that pose little risk or groundbreaking 
potential, and they often must develop specialized skills and 
knowledge to overcome technical difficulties.17 Nevertheless, their 
capabilities are improving, and the activities of do-it-yourselfers 
cannot be ignored in light of the technology’s increasing power and 
accessibility. 
Practitioners of DIYbio sometimes label themselves 
“biohackers,” drawing comparisons to the Silicon Valley hobbyists 
and inventors who initiated the digital revolution in the 1970s.18 Like 
their Silicon Valley counterparts, many DIY biologists believe their 
efforts could lead to new insights and breakthroughs.19 Other DIY 
biologists approach genetic manipulation as a way to produce art.20 
Like the open-source software movement, DIYbio emphasizes 
transparency and relies on the open exchange of information, 
materials, and publications.21 The application of crowdfunding 
techniques to DIYbio further amplifies the potential spread of 
DIYbio activity.22 
 
research. Unlike other gene-editing methods, it is cheap, quick and easy to use, and it has 
swept through labs around the world as a result.”). 
 16. See Todd Kuiken, Learn from DIY Biologists, 531 NATURE 167, 167 (2016) 
(noting how high school students and users of community labs participating in the 2015 
International Genetically Engineered Machine competition used “[starting] kits 
contain[ing] more than 1,000 standard biological parts .	.	. need[ed] to engineer a biological 
system”); Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 116 (“As these promising biological technologies 
become easier to manipulate, achievements, such as plasmid refactoring, that were once 
only possible in leading laboratories are becoming routine for undergraduates, high school 
students, and even amateur biologists (that is, biologists who practice science as a ‘hobby’, 
usually outside of scientific institutions).”). 
 17. Jefferson et al., supra note 13, at 3–5; see also ALESSANDRO DELFANTI, 
BIOHACKERS: THE POLITICS OF OPEN SCIENCE 115 (2013); Ledford, Biohackers, supra 
note 15, at 399; Jefferson, supra note 4, at 4. 
 18. See Ledford, supra note 7, at 650–51. For more examples of biohackers and their 
goals, see Seth Bannon, Biotech in the Garage, CLIMB HIGHER (July 6, 2015), 
http://sethbannon.com/biotech-in-the-garage [https://perma.cc/4KXP-FHWC] and Marcus 
Wohlsen, Cow Milk Without the Cow Is Coming to Change Food Forever, WIRED (Apr. 
15, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/diy-biotech-vegan-cheese/ [https://perma.cc/ND4Q-
BUV3]. 
 19. See Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 118. 
 20. See R. Alta Charo & Henry T. Greely, CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks, 15 
AM. J. BIOETHICS 11, 13 (2015) (noting that “[b]ioart” already exists and speculating on 
efforts to produce “dwarf elephants, giant guinea pigs, or genetically tamed tigers”). 
 21. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 8; Ledford, supra note 7, at 651. 
 22. See Kuiken, supra note 16, at 168 (noting that synthetic biologist Josiah Zayner 
raised over $62,000 online to fund the production and distribution of DIY CRISPR kits). 
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In one of the best-known DIYbio projects to date, three 
hobbyists created a bioluminescent plant and formed Glowing Plant, 
Inc., a start-up company, to promote it.23 Glowing Plant raised nearly 
half a million dollars through a crowdfunding campaign that promised 
seeds of the genetically altered plant to financial supporters.24 The 
fact that the plant is related to a weed led to concerns that unhindered 
dissemination could lead to the exchange of genes with wild relatives 
and ecological disruption.25 Yet no mechanism for regulatory 
oversight appeared applicable, as the federal agency responsible for 
regulating plant pests concluded that it lacked regulatory jurisdiction 
over the plant.26 The Glowing Plant incident may be a harbinger of 
things to come. In the future, CRISPR-Cas9 and other gene 
manipulation techniques could allow individuals to rapidly alter the 
genomes of mosquitoes, weeds, or other organisms—whether 
deliberately or not.27 
DIYbio raises non-ecological concerns as well. In the lab, DIY 
biologists may fail to heed basic safety precautions that trained 
scientists routinely follow and may suffer hazardous chemical 
exposures.28 Moreover, using gene sequences ordered online, DIYbio 
practitioners could reconstruct the DNA of harmful viruses and 
microorganisms, a possibility that attracted the FBI’s attention.29 
However, assurances from biotechnology experts that “mere 
knowledge of a viral genome is far from sufficient to be able to re-
constitute it or to create a disease-forming pathogen” eased initial 
fears that bioterrorism could arise from DIYbio activity.30 DIYbio 
 
 23. Beth Baker, DIYbio—Alternative Career Path for Biologists?, 65 BIOSCIENCE 
112, 112 (2015); Lisa M. Krieger, Bay Area: Tech Business’ Project About Much More than 
Glowing Plant, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci
_23889241/gene-engineers-popular-glow-dark-plant-tests-less [https://perma.cc/YY9T-PRYQ]. 
 24. Krieger, supra note 23. The company, since renamed Taxa Biotechnologies, Inc., 
has yet to produce a plant that produces much glow or to ship any seeds to backers. See 
Antonio Regalado, Why Kickstarter’s Glowing Plant Left Backers in the Dark, MIT TECH. 
REV. (July 15, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601884/why-kickstarters-
glowing-plant-left-backers-in-the-dark/ [https://perma.cc/4YZQ-EWCN]. 
 25. Krieger, supra note 23. 
 26. LYNN L. BERGESON ET AL., WILSON CTR., THE DNA OF THE U.S. 
REGULATORY SYSTEM: ARE WE GETTING IT RIGHT FOR SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY? 45–46 
(2015) (reporting the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s conclusion that it 
lacked jurisdiction because the engineered plants involve no plant pests). 
 27. Greely, supra note 15. 
 28. See Dustin T. Holloway, Regulating Amateurs, SCIENTIST, March 2013, 27, 28. 
 29. Ledford, supra note 7, at 651–52. 
 30. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW 
DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 72 
(2010) (noting that one must also have an appropriate host and conditions for a virus to 
grow); see also GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (reporting survey results finding that 
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presently poses a minimal bioterrorism threat, as terrorists have other 
available weapons that are proven, more readily available, and easier 
to deploy.31 Moreover, most DIY biologists “work in community 
spaces that require BSL-1 lab conditions,”32 which means that 
experiments involve “well-characterized agents not known to 
consistently cause disease in immunocompetent adult humans, and 
present minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the 
environment.”33 Nonetheless, the FBI has maintained a 
“neighborhood watch” approach that “relies on biohackers 
monitoring their own community and reporting behaviour they find 
threatening.”34 
B. 3D Printing 
3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing,35 offers 
another instance of distributed innovation that warrants society’s 
attention. Working from computer design files, 3D printing 
manufactures three-dimensional objects by building up or binding 
multiple thin layers of plastics, metals, or other materials.36 3D 
printing’s ability to produce complex items in one piece offers 
advantages in terms of structural integrity, weight, and waste 
reduction.37 
3D-printing technology itself is not new, as engineers have used 
it for decades to create prototypes.38 In recent years, advances in 
computing power, software, and materials have broadly expanded its 
use by small businesses, entrepreneurs, and hobbyists.39 3D printing 
now enables ordinary people to create complex custom objects more 
 
most DIY biologists are “still learning basic biotechnology” and work with low-risk 
organisms). 
 31. See Filippa Lentzos, Don’t Single Out the DIY Community, in Skerrett, supra note 
15. 
 32. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 15. 
 33. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BIOSAFETY IN 
MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 30 (5th ed. 2009). 
 34. Ledford, supra note 7, at 652; see also Sara Tocchetti & Sara Angeli Aguiton, Is an 
FBI Agent a DIY Biologist Like Any Other? A Cultural Analysis of a Biosecurity Risk, 40 
SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 825, 829 (2015) (discussing the formation of a working 
relationship between the FBI and the DIYbio community). 
 35. HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D 
PRINTING 65 (2013). 
 36. See id. at 65–84; Lucas Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The 
Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 558–59 (2014). 
 37. See Snow, supra note 1, at 20. 
 38. Robert Olson, A Boon or a Bane?, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 2013, at 34, 35. 
 39. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 35, at 11. 
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quickly, cheaply, and skillfully than was previously possible.40 
Individuals can purchase their own 3D printers, access a 3D printer in 
a communal workspace, or use online services to print objects.41 A 
wide range of objects can be printed, including guns, food, body parts, 
and living tissue.42 Perhaps the most significant constraints on 3D 
printing today are its slow speed—which is dictated in part by the 
time it takes for material to harden—and its inability to print with 
materials that have dissimilar melting points.43 
Like DIYbio, 3D printing enables individuals to engage in 
innovative activities that, because of their cost and complexity, were 
previously limited to institutional actors.44 Both DIYbio and 3D 
printing are subcategories of the maker movement, which refers to a 
broad range of inventors, designers, and tinkerers who are engaged in 
making things themselves, whether for fun or profit.45 Used by many 
maker enthusiasts, 3D printing is a “broad platform technology” that 
could change manufacturing practices, facilitate technological 
breakthroughs, and transform society.46 
3D printing may raise several concerns for policymakers, 
however. First, the 3D-printing process can have adverse health or 
environmental effects. 3D printing may involve the use of toxic or 
explosive substances.47 Operating 3D printers may lead to chemical 
respiratory exposures comparable to indoor smoking, causing 
headaches, nausea, and severe skin and eye irritation.48 In commercial 
 
 40. See id. at 20–24, 30–33. 
 41. See John Schryber & Farah Tabibkhoei, Insurance Issues, in REED SMITH, 3D 
PRINTING OF MEDICAL DEVICES 22, 22 (Colleen Davies et al. eds., 2015), 
https://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/130448b9-7565-4295-a697-5c5d7c6eb516
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9ba9b53c-2009-488d-ba91-5cc5a19a38f7/3d-printing-
white-paper_79444049.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T3D-C7G8] (discussing the accessibility of 
3D printers). 
 42. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 561; Olson, supra note 38, at 34–35, 38; see also Lisa 
Baird & Matthew Jacobson, 3D Printing and Its Impact on Medical Device and Health 
Care, in 3D PRINTING OF MEDICAL DEVICES, supra note 41, at 4, 4–5 (discussing medical 
applications). 
 43. See Olson, supra note 38, at 35. 
 44. See id. at 34, 38 (noting how DIY biologists could use 3D printers to print their 
own living tissue or bacteria). 
 45. See Tim Bajarin, Why the Maker Movement Is Important to America’s Future, 
TIME (May 19, 2014), http://time.com/104210/maker-faire-maker-movement/ [http://perma.cc
/6Y7Y-AMBU]. 
 46. LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 35, at 50; see also Bajarin, supra note 45; Doug 
Gross, Obama’s Speech Highlights Rise of 3-D Printing, CNN (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/13/tech/innovation/obama-3d-printing/ [https://perma.cc/KXE8-
YD3T]. 
 47. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 564; Olson, supra note 38, at 37.  
 48. See Olson, supra note 38, at 37. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018) 
2018] HERDING CATS 955 
facilities, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
regulations could limit worker exposures and reduce combustion risks 
by mandating protective equipment and practices.49 In other 
environments, however, students or hobbyists engaged in 3D printing 
may be less familiar with potential hazards and less apt to adopt 
appropriate precautionary measures. Furthermore, while 3D printing 
is sometimes hailed as a means of reducing manufacturing waste and 
the need to transport goods long distances,50 the overall 
environmental impact of 3D printing will depend on particular 
machines and materials, as well as on patterns of use.51 
Second, 3D-printed products may warrant even greater 
regulatory attention. Toys and other everyday products are normally 
subject to industry standards and some consumer-protection 
requirements, however minimal.52 Objects produced by 3D printing, 
in contrast, might escape conventional regulatory channels as a result 
of their origin or small-scale manufacture. Furthermore, 3D printing 
could be used for nefarious purposes: one might print counterfeit 
machinery parts designed to break, potentially causing catastrophic 
consequences.53 Terrorists might print biological weapons, chemical 
weapons, or drones designed to deliver explosives or other deadly 
payloads.54 3D printing also may be used to manufacture closely 
 
 49. Id. at 38. Compliance with OSHA regulations may be another matter entirely, 
however. See id.; see also Todd Maiden & Farah Tabibkhoei, Environmental Effects and 
Health Risks in the Workplace, in 3D PRINTING OF MEDICAL DEVICES, supra note 41, at 
20, 20–21 (recounting OSHA citation issued to 3D-printing company for various violations 
of workplace safety standards). 
 50. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 564–65. 
 51. See Olson, supra note 38, at 36–38. 
 52. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §	2056(a) (2012) (authorizing promulgation of consumer 
product safety standards); §	2056b (establishing mandatory toy safety standards). The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission’s effectiveness has been widely questioned. See, 
e.g., Russell T. Gips, Comment, From China with Lead: The Hasty Reform of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 547–48, 555–56 (2009) 
(noting widespread criticism of the Commission). 
 53. See Peter Jensen-Haxel, 3D Printers, Physical Viruses, and the Regulation of 
Cloud Supercomputing in the Era of Limitless Design, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 737, 
767–68 (2016) (discussing how hackers will attack various weak links in the computer-
aided design process at the heart of 3D printing); Kathy Wren, Realizing the Full Benefits 
of 3D Printing Will Require Openness, Experts Say, AAAS NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.aaas.org/news/realizing-full-benefits-3d-printing-will-require-openness-experts
-say [https://perma.cc/6PD9-SMTE]. 
 54. See Emerging Technologies: Lowering the Threshold for ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria) Mass Casualty Terrorism, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BLOG: BLACK SIX (July 31, 
2015, 2:41 AM), http://bio-defencewarfareanalyst.blogspot.com/2015/07 [https://perma.cc
/44DN-CU8J (dark archive)]; Roxanne Palmer, 3D Printing Risks: Not Just Plastic Guns, 
but Military Parts, Drugs and Chemical Weapons, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 24, 2013), 
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regulated items such as weapons55 or custom-designed drugs.56 
Although plastic 3D-printed guns are subject to overheating and 
cracking after a few uses, such guns are difficult for security 
equipment to detect, can be shaped in unrecognizable forms, and 
could be particularly appealing to hobbyists and teenagers.57 In 
addition, the quality and capabilities of printed guns are rapidly 
improving.58 Fear that 3D printing would lead to the proliferation of 
plastic guns has led to proposals to limit or ban their production.59 
The United States Department of State has attempted to curb the 
online publication of digital gun files, contending that such 
publication could violate the International Trade in Arms 
regulations.60 The ease of copying and sharing electronic files, 
however, may make these efforts futile.61 
Third, by facilitating the counterfeiting of objects, 3D printing 
also has the potential to undermine intellectual property protections 
and confound the identification of persons responsible for intellectual 




 55. Wren, supra note 53 (citing examples of 3D-printed guns and “keys that can open 
high-security locks”); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing potential use of 3D 
printing to produce nuclear weapons components). 
 56. LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 35, at 220–21; Snow, supra note 1, at 1. 
 57. Nick Bilton, The Rise of 3-D Printed Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2014, at E2. 
Various gun control measures, including registration and marking requirements, could 
readily be circumvented by printing plastic guns. DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND., SHOULD GOVERNMENT REGULATE ILLICIT USES OF 3D 
PRINTING? 3 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-regulate-illicit-3d-printing.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RRP5-Q765]. 
 58. Adam Clark Estes, 3D-Printed Guns Are Only Getting Better, and Scarier, 
GIZMODO (Jan. 6, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/3d-printed-guns-are-only-getting-better-and-
scarier-1677747439 [http://perma.cc/2QZS-TCTK]; see Rob Walker, A Crypto-Anarchist 
Will Help You Build a DIY AR-15, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-cody-wilson-ghost-gunner-ar-15/ [http://perma.cc
/G6HW-2PVG]. 
 59. See, e.g., Undetectable Firearms Modernization Act of 2015, H.R. 2699, 114th 
Cong. §	2 (2015). The Undetectable Firearms Act prohibits the manufacture, distribution, 
or possession of guns that cannot be detected by a metal detector. 18 U.S.C. §	922(p)(1)–
(6) (2012). 
 60. Andy Greenberg, Feds Tighten Restrictions on 3-D Printed Gun Files Online, 
WIRED (June 11, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/feds-restrict-3d-printed-gun-files/ 
[http://perma.cc/MB4C-WHJA]. 
 61. See CASTRO, supra note 57, at 2. 
 62. See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing 
and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1703 (2014) (contending that “3D 
printing brings the problems of digitization to patents for the first time”); see also id. at 
1713–14 (recommending that Congress create a patent infringement exception for 
personal 3D printing and notice-and-takedown rules for sites that host 3D-printing 
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copying and creating, 3D printing may weaken some of the rationales 
that underlie existing intellectual property regimes.63 
C. The Sharing Economy 
Finally, consider one other example of distributed innovation: 
the sharing economy. Distributed innovation in this context involves 
not only the sharing economy itself but also the proliferation of digital 
platforms that enable sharing-economy activities. Though there is no 
agreed-upon definition of the sharing economy, the term generally 
refers to a wide range of activities “in which assets or services are 
shared between private individuals, either free or for a fee, typically 
by means of the Internet.”64 At the heart of the sharing economy are 
digital-platform technologies that enable more intensive use of 
resources, whether in the form of housing stock, motor vehicles, or 
human labor. These platform technologies lower transaction costs and 
facilitate nearly instantaneous exchanges, often bypassing traditional 
businesses in favor of peer-to-peer transactions.65 
 
software); Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era 
of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1325 (2015) (proposing theory of “digital 
patent infringement” in which creation of digital files that can directly print objects might 
infringe a patent claim relating to the underlying physical object). See generally Tabrez Y. 
Ebrahim, 3D Printing: Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 37 (2016) (exploring patent law issues). 
 63. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 583 (suggesting that the consumer protection 
rationale for trademark law does not apply where consumers themselves violate 
trademark protections by printing a counterfeit object). 
 64. Sharing Economy, OXFORD DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sharing-economy 
[http://perma.cc/CJH3-8Y82]; see also Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape 
of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 3 (2012) (listing various collaborative 
practices considered to be a part of the sharing economy); DAMIEN DEMAILLY & ANNE-
SOPHIE NOVEL, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, THE SHARING 
ECONOMY: MAKE IT SUSTAINABLE 13–14 (2014), http://www.iddri.org/Evenements
/Interventions/ST0314_DD%20ASN_sharing%20economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDW8-
NU4J] (setting out sharing models of redistribution of goods, mutualization of goods, and 
shared mobility); JULIET SCHOR, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE, DEBATING THE 
SHARING ECONOMY 2 (2014), http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications
/Schor_Debating_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE8J-QGRW] (describing 
the sharing economy as “recirculation of goods, increased utilization of durable assets, 
exchange of services, and sharing of productive assets”). It is worth noting that much of 
the activity falling under the “sharing economy” rubric does not involve actual sharing of 
economic resources. A perhaps more accurate account describes users of digital platforms 
as engaging in “shared value creation.” BRHMIE BALARAM, ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF ARTS, MANUFACTURES & COMMERCE, FAIR SHARE: 
RECLAIMING POWER IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 15 (2016), https://www.thersa.org
/globalassets/pdfs/reports/rsa-fair-share.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LNY-PJ58]. 
 65. See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89–90 (2016); 
Noah Zon, The Sharing Economy and Why It Matters for Policy Makers, PUB. SECTOR 
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In contrast to DIYbio and 3D printing, which introduce new 
ways to invent and produce things, the activities that make up the 
sharing economy generally are not themselves new.66 People have 
long offered rides, lodging, and other goods and services for 
exchange. However, these entrepreneurial activities are occurring 
through peer-to-peer exchanges on an unprecedented scale, and 
consequently their cumulative impacts are warranting society’s 
attention for the first time. Through such platforms as Uber, Airbnb, 
and Taskrabbit, “[m]illions of people are becoming part-time 
entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models and entrenched 
market interests, and challenging regulated industries.”67 
Moreover, while sharing-economy activities themselves may not 
be novel, there is indeed something novel about the sharing economy 
itself. Capitalizing on the ubiquity of smartphones and internet 
connectivity, innovators are using digital-platform technologies to 
constantly invent new marketplaces for exchange. A leading directory 
lists nearly 10,000 sharing-economy companies worldwide, with more 
added virtually every day.68 From a regulator’s point of view, the 
launch of a new business may hardly be remarkable. The launch of a 
new marketplace, however, may be an entirely different matter worth 
noting. 
Potential benefits of the sharing economy include greater access 
to goods and services, lower prices for consumers, and increased 
income for providers.69 The sharing economy’s rapid growth reflects 
strong interest on the part of both consumers and providers in reaping 
 
DIG., Dec. 2015, at 2, https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications
/PublicSectorDigest_TheSharingEconomyandWhyitMattersforPolicyMakers.pdf [perma.cc
/HZ2W-MBVD].  
 66. Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the 
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 433, 456 (2015). 
 67. Lobel, supra note 65, at 90–91. 
 68. Partners, MESH, http://meshing.it/partners [perma.cc/5GMA-GAP3]; see also 
Sharing Economy Startups, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/sharing-economy-4 [https://perma.cc
/Z5DQ-C4E4]. 
 69. See Ranchordás, supra note 66, at 466. In addition, sharing activities that do not 
involve direct economic exchange, such as gifting practices or tool lending, strengthen 
social capital by facilitating communication and cooperation. See Russell Belk, Sharing, 36 
J. CONSUMER RES. 715, 717 (2010) (“Sharing .	.	. goes hand in hand with trust and 
bonding. It differs from economic exchange, which rarely creates communal bonds 
with other people.”); see also JULIAN AGYEMAN, DUNCAN MCLAREN & ADRIANNE 
SCHAEFER-BORREGO, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, SHARING CITIES 16–17 (2013), 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/agyeman_sharing_cities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28K2-Q5VX]. 
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these benefits.70 In economic terms, the sharing economy potentially 
addresses various market failures by increasing competition, reducing 
transaction costs and informational asymmetry, putting underutilized 
capital to use, and challenging the capture of regulatory agencies.71 
Notwithstanding these benefits, the sharing economy also raises 
various concerns. Participants in sharing-economy transactions may 
encounter deceptive techniques, unsafe conditions, or unfair labor 
practices.72 For established operators, the sharing economy represents 
new competition that may gain an unfair advantage by skirting 
traditional regulatory regimes.73 Furthermore, sharing-economy 
transactions may generate a range of external effects, including 
decreased tax revenue for governments, increased noise and traffic 
for neighbors, greater burdens on infrastructure, and disrupted labor 
and housing markets.74 Although the notion of “sharing” suggests less 
resource-intensive ways of doing things, the overall environmental 
impacts of the sharing economy are unclear. Not only does the 
sharing economy involve little actual sharing, but the lower prices it 
often brings also can foster higher levels of consumption.75 
Additionally, the technology underlying the sharing economy collects 
vast quantities of data, raising concerns about loss of privacy. 
The large numbers of individuals participating in the sharing 
economy, often on a part-time basis and through evolving business 
models, challenge conventional models of government regulation.76 
As one commentator has remarked, “many sharing economy 
businesses have violated state or local government laws.”77 The law, 
 
 70. See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 157 (2016). 
 71. Cristopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy 
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531–32 (2015); see also Lobel, supra note 65, at 89–90. 
 72. See Miller, supra note 70, at 152. 
 73. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government 
Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 922–
23 (2015). 
 74. Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the 
Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 983–90 (2016); see also Lobel, supra note 
65, at 126–38; Miller, supra note 70, at 169 (noting that sharing economy “harm is often 
uniquely challenging to determine” but also suggesting possible community harms 
engendered by short-term housing rentals). 
 75. See DEMAILLY & NOVEL, supra note 64, at 8 (“[S]haring models can either be a 
vector for a sustainable, less material type of consumption or, conversely, a vector for the 
hyperconsumption of goods.”); SCHOR, supra note 64, at 7 (“The [sharing] platforms are 
creating new markets that expand the volume of commerce and boost purchasing 
power.”). 
 76. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 101–02. 
 77. Miller, supra note 70, at 149. 
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which works through definitions, rules, and boundaries, is often 
poorly equipped to keep up with the sharing economy and its 
dynamic and distributed nature.78 
 
*     *     * 
 
The preceding discussion highlights leading examples of 
distributed innovation. DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing 
economy shift power away from government, big business, and other 
traditionally powerful institutions. Yet these examples are just a 
subset of emerging technologies that pose new governance 
challenges.79 Across society, rapid technological change—whether in 
the form of drones, autonomous vehicles, digital currencies, or smart 
infrastructure—threatens to disrupt conventional regulatory models.80 
In an ever-changing environment, where individual conduct can have 
dramatic consequences for society, how can society govern that 
conduct? 
II.  CHALLENGES THAT DISTRIBUTED-INNOVATION TECHNOLOGIES 
POSE FOR REGULATORS 
Distributed innovation can be a powerful force for economic 
growth, technological breakthroughs, and social change. Drawing on 
the energy and creativity of individuals to produce new products and 
services, distributed innovation broadens the innovation process. 
Furthermore, distributed innovation can offer personal fulfillment 
and generate income while putting underutilized human and real 
capital to work.81 
Distributed innovation nonetheless warrants the attention of 
regulators. Participants in distributed innovation themselves may 
need protection, and distributed-innovation activities may have 
adverse consequences on non-participants as well. Oversight—
broadly understood here to refer to some form of third-party 
intervention, governmental or otherwise—can correct market 
 
 78. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 102. 
 79. See Larry Downes, Fewer, Faster, Smarter, DEMOCRACY J., Fall 2015, at 3, 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/38/fewer-faster-smarter/ [https://perma.cc/JV5U-
GR6G]. 
 80. Id. Contemporary methods of terrorism, in which terror groups use social media 
to radicalize, recruit, and inspire terrorist activity in disparate locations, raise similar 
challenges. See YONAH ALEXANDER & DEAN ALEXANDER, THE ISLAMIC STATE: 
COMBATING THE CALIPHATE WITHOUT BORDERS 55 (2015). 
 81. Lakhani & Panetta, supra note 2, at 103–04. 
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failures, incentivize competition, and ensure a level playing field. 
Equally important, oversight can “address public safety, quality 
control, privacy, access, equality, fairness, and distributional 
concerns.”82 
This Part explores a number of reasons why distributed 
innovation poses particular difficulties for regulators. Law’s 
categorical nature makes it difficult to apply to dynamic and 
differentiated processes. Logistical, political, and cultural barriers 
may hamper regulation of distributed innovation. Even further, the 
harms associated with distributed innovation may be difficult to 
identify. 
A. Law’s Categorical Nature 
Law is often viewed as hostile to innovation. Undoubtedly, 
regulatory environments may involve rigid hierarchies, inflexible 
processes, and aversion to change.83 Yet policymakers face the tricky 
task of balancing competing interests when regulating innovation. 
Excessive regulatory burdens can stifle innovation but so can 
regulatory uncertainty.84 Well-designed laws—in tax, intellectual 
property, and other areas—can create incentives for innovation and 
foster a stable environment in which people are willing to invest 
efforts and resources in innovation.85 
Law relies on the process of categorization to determine what 
and how behavior is governed.86 But distributed-innovation activities 
often do not fit neatly within existing legal categories.87 The sharing 
economy provides numerous examples of this difficulty, as legal 
battles rage over whether to regulate Uber drivers like taxi drivers, 
 
 82. Lobel, supra note 65, at 118; see SUNIL JOHAL & NOAH ZON, MOWAT CTR., 
POLICYMAKING FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY: BEYOND WHACK-A-MOLE 13 (2015), 
https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications/106_policymaking_for_the_sharing
_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMK6-5BJH] (“In many cases, unfamiliarity with sharing 
economy models has hindered the ability of governments to recognize potential benefits 
such as innovation, economic growth, and more efficient networks for urban 
transportation and logistics.”). 
 83. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 14–17. 
 84. Ranchordás, supra note 66, at 440–42. 
 85. See id. at 448; see also ALBERT C. LIN, PROMETHEUS REIMAGINED: 
TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT, AND LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7 (2013); 
Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2264–69 (2010) 
(summarizing debates on role of law in fostering innovation). 
 86. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 102 (“Law and language attempt to chart boundaries, 
and yet they are inherently limited in covering all forms of life and human imagination.”). 
 87. See Vanessa Katz, Note, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1067, 1092 (2015); see also JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 13. 
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whether to treat Airbnb hosts like hotel operators, and how to govern 
digital platforms themselves.88 Heavy-handed attempts to apply 
existing laws to individual operators may chill economically 
productive activity or drive it underground, making it harder to track, 
assess, and regulate.89 
In some instances, distributed-innovation activities may fall 
completely outside of existing oversight structures. Many laws were 
“designed for a Fordist era of mass production, where centralised 
entities are producing items which are then sold in shops and bought 
complete by consumers.”90 Regulatory regimes may exempt small-
scale operators, explicitly or implicitly, because the benefit from 
regulating de minimis activities may not justify the effort.91 Small-
scale exemptions also can protect privacy or advance a societal 
interest in lowering barriers to entry.92 Nevertheless, the key 
assumption underlying such exemptions—that the effects of small-
scale activities do not matter—may not hold true in an increasing 
number of contexts.93 Collectively, distributed-innovation activities 
may achieve such a scale that they can significantly affect surrounding 
 
 88. See Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From 
the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1581–84 (2017) (discussing policy 
disruptions fueled by business innovation). California, for example, has established a 
regulatory system to govern Lyft, UberX, and other “transportation network companies,” 
a term defined to include “an organization .	.	. that provides prearranged transportation 
services for compensation using an online-enabled application (app) or platform to 
connect passengers with drivers using their personal vehicles.” Decision Adopting Rules 
and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the 
Transportation Industry at 2, Decision No. 13-09-045, Rulemaking No. 12-12-011 (Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 10230598, at *1; see Sarah E. Light, 
Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 377 (2017) 
(noting that the California “rule appears to have served as a model for other states”).  
 89. See Miller, supra note 70, at 168 (citing the failure of a heavy-handed approach to 
regulating illegal music sharing). 
 90. Angela Daly, Don’t Believe the Hype? Recent 3D Printing Developments for Law 
and Society, in 3D PRINTING AND BEYOND: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS SURROUNDING 3D PRINTING AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY (Lemley et 
al. eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2800955 [https://perma.cc/J8BH-BBJA]. 
 91. See, e.g., Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and 
Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 219 (2014) 
(discussing environmental law exemptions for “many of the individually small human 
actions that contribute to [pressing environmental] harms”); Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1394–96 (2011) 
(identifying various instances in which “[t]he law exempts small contributors and entities 
from regulation”); Zale, supra note 74, at 960–61. 
 92. Zale, supra note 74, at 961–67 (discussing various factors justifying regulatory 
leniency for small-scale activities). 
 93. JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 14 (noting that sharing economy has transformed 
the scale of such activities, making them so significant as to require regulatory attention). 
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environments and existing markets.94 Under such circumstances, the 
exemption of small-scale activities may lead to the failure to achieve 
regulatory goals.95 Sometimes, regulatory attention to small-scale 
activity may be warranted even if its expected cumulative effects are 
small. DIYbio experiments offer an example of seemingly 
insignificant activity whose potential for catastrophic consequences 
may necessitate some form of oversight.96 
B. Barriers to Applying Law 
Where existing legal regimes do apply to distributed-innovation 
activities, logistical, political, and cultural barriers may make it 
difficult to monitor and enforce existing laws against those activities. 
Merely identifying participants in distributed-innovation activities 
poses a challenge because their participation may be sporadic, 
anonymous, or of low magnitude.97 Even if participants are 
identifiable, there are still other logistical challenges, as it can be 
costly and resource-intensive to administer regulatory requirements 
to a large number of entities or individuals scattered across various 
locations. In addition, the application of legal regimes to distributed-
innovation activities may also face political difficulties; some 
individuals resist regulatory burdens they perceive as excessive. 
Difficulties may be cultural as well. 3D printing, for example, is 
becoming popular among communities of users that may lack a 
“history of safe manufacturing, such as maker communities, small 
startups, schools and hobbyists.”98 Similarly, individual participants in 
the sharing economy lack the familiarity and expertise of large 
corporations in navigating complex regulatory requirements.99 
 
 94. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 70, at 160–61 (noting that Airbnb offers more rooms 
than, and has a market valuation comparable to, the largest hotel chains). 
 95. Cf. Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 91, at 1397–98 (remarking, in context of 
climate change, that “[s]mall potatoes might be discarded (or discardable), but the 
calculation for doing so changes if there are only small potatoes”). 
 96. See supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text (discussing potential risks associated 
with DIYbio activities). 
 97. See, e.g., Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 62, at 1323 (observing that digital 
manufacturing technology “decentralizes and partially anonymizes the manufacture of 
tangible objects”). 
 98. DAVID REJESKI & YONG HUANG, WILSON CTR., ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
HEALTH IMPACTS OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 10 (2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org
/sites/default/files/nsf_am_env_final_red.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP2N-8T47]. 
 99. See Miller, supra note 70, at 167–68 (noting that most participants in short-term 
rental market “often have no experience with the regulatory structures businesses face in 
either the physical or administrative environments”). 
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Further complicating matters, the dispersed nature of 
distributed-innovation activities may make any associated harms 
difficult to identify. For example, sharing-economy activities may 
adversely affect neighbors or other members of a community.100 
However, these effects are generally less obvious than those 
associated with a traditional operator, who, as part of the 
conventional permitting process, may have adopted measures to 
mitigate those externalities.101 Similarly, 3D printing may result in 
chemical exposure and contribute to chronic health problems.102 
While these sorts of hazards are often overlooked, they may be 
especially likely to escape attention if they occur in the home. DIYbio 
also may involve uncertain harms or hazards that are hard to identify. 
In particular, the risks associated with an engineered microorganism’s 
escape into the environment may be impossible to determine ahead 
of time.103 Furthermore, any escape may not be detected until after it 
is too late to deploy measures to kill or contain the microorganism. 
Finally, the dynamic nature of distributed innovation adds a 
further layer of complexity for would-be regulators. The sharing 
economy provides perhaps the most obvious example: it has 
introduced new business models at a dizzying rate, thanks in large 
part to minimal infrastructure requirements.104 In these rapidly 
changing conditions, conventional approaches to regulation, which 
rely heavily on command-and-control techniques and prescriptive 
standards, may be unable to respond to change in a timely manner.105 
The rulemaking processes typically used to establish or change such 
standards are often cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming.106 A 
failure to update legal standards can reinforce the status quo or leave 
innovative technologies without oversight, resulting in regulatory 
gaps. Regulatory efforts attempting to keep pace with distributed 
innovation are likely to resemble “a frantic game of ‘whack-a-mole’” 
 
 100. See id. at 170. 
 101. See id. at 170–71 (suggesting that harms associated with short-term residential 
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PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 7, 110–11 (2017) (discussing the development of 
genomically engineered microorganisms and synthetic communities of microbes that have 
few or no comparators, as a result of which risk assessment is more difficult). 
 104. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 102 (“The most important aspect of the platform 
economy is that it includes an ecology of continuously evolving business models.”). 
 105. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 14. 
 106. See Albert C. Lin, Preliminary Injunctive Regulation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 
1035–40 (2016). 
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as new enterprises rapidly render legal categories and standards 
obsolete.107 
None of the above discussion even touches on the jurisdictional 
issues that distributed innovation raises. Because of their novelty and 
small scale, distributed-innovation activities often fall into regulatory 
gaps, thereby raising the issue of who might be an appropriate 
regulator. Federal, state, or local governments may assume that some 
other level of government will address a new concern. Within a single 
level of government, agencies may assume that some other agency 
will act. And even when an agency recognizes that an issue falls 
within its jurisdiction, organizational hierarchies and silos may 
impede the development of an optimal regulatory approach.108 
Various features of distributed innovation, including difficulty of 
definition, dynamic change, complexity of causation, fragmented 
activity, and autonomous social actors, confound conventional 
regulation.109 These factors demonstrate that careful attention is 
needed when designing regulatory tools for these areas and 
contemplating additional means of oversight. Given these unique 
features, it may prove especially useful to consider how regulators 
have addressed regulatory concerns outside of conventional contexts 
when crafting regulations for distributed innovation. 
III.  INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
How can society address the challenge of overseeing distributed 
innovation without unduly hampering it? As this challenge is largely 
one of managing small-scale behavior, valuable insights may be 
gained by considering environmental regulatory responses to small-
scale behavior in other contexts. First, United States environmental 
law and legal academics have increasingly directed their attention to 
individual behaviors that contribute to environmental harms. Second, 
developing countries have long struggled with addressing small-scale 
activities that have large cumulative effects on the environment. 
Experience in these areas suggests that “decentred regulation”—
regulation that acknowledges government’s limited capacity in certain 
 
 107. JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 1, 13 (noting that “the speed and scale of change 
and the difficulty of categorizing [sharing economy] enterprises” are key characteristics 
that challenge policymakers). 
 108. Id. at 16. 
 109. See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 106–12 
(2001). 
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circumstances to control conduct and that enlists nongovernmental 
actors to assist in the task—offers an important approach.110 
A. Recognizing the Role of Individual Behavior in United States 
Environmental Law 
Historically, American environmental law focused on industrial 
and commercial facilities (hereafter referred to collectively as 
“industrial facilities”) as the primary subjects of regulation.111 While 
current regulation has largely maintained this focus, scholars and 
regulators have also come to recognize the significant contribution of 
individual behaviors to environmental problems. 
The premise underlying this focus—that industrial facilities 
generate the bulk of environmental harms and, therefore, should bear 
the primary burden of addressing them112—was generally a 
reasonable one. Pollution from industrial facilities is often harmful, 
obvious, and readily controllable. Compared to other pollution 
sources, such facilities are relatively homogenous, few in number, 
and, consequently, administratively easier to regulate.113 Accordingly, 
the federal and state governments applied schemes of command-and-
control regulation to industrial facilities, and, in response to 
complaints of inefficiency and inflexibility, later added economic 
incentive programs that continued to focus on these sources.114 
Individuals, by contrast, largely received a “free pass” from federal 
environmental regulation.115 The attention to industrial facilities, 
though somewhat simplistic, yielded substantial progress in reducing 
pollution. 
Significant challenges remain, however, and new threats—most 
notably climate change—have gained prominence. Perceiving the 
limitations of focusing on industrial pollution, various scholars have 
drawn attention to the contributions of individual behavior to climate 
 
 110. See id. at 112–13. 
 111. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as 
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 524–26 
(2004). 
 112. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command 
and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 206 (2001). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 526–29. In command-and-control schemes, 
“the government sets both the environmental ends to be achieved .	.	. and the methods by 
which they will be achieved .	.	.	.” Id. at 526. 
 115. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, An Unnatural Divide: How Law Obscures 
Individual Environmental Harms, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CONTRASTING IDEAS 
OF NATURE 28, 28–29 (Keith H. Hirokawa ed., 2014). 
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change, water pollution, and other problems.116 Environmentally 
significant individual behaviors include motor vehicle use, household 
energy consumption, and use of cleaners, pesticides, and other 
consumer products.117 These often habitual behaviors may be hard to 
change, and they frequently take place within the home, making them 
problematic to police. Yet because of the cumulative environmental 
significance of these behaviors, regulating industry alone will not be 
enough.118 Indeed, individual behavior’s proportional contribution to 
environmental problems will only grow as regulators continue to 
ratchet down industrial pollution.119 Failing to regulate individual 
behavior not only leaves environmental problems unaddressed but 
also sends a misleading message that individuals are not responsible 
for environmental harms.120 
Although the environmental significance of individual behavior 
has been acknowledged, this recognition has not necessarily 
prompted its regulation. Indeed, two of the leading federal initiatives 
to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions exemplify a continued 
focus on industrial sources of pollution. First, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) crafted the 2010 Tailoring Rule, which 
governs new sources of GHG emissions, specifically to avoid 
 
 116. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 214–16; Katrina Fischer Kuh, When 
Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors That Harm the Environment, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2012); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Individual as Polluter, 35 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10723, 10724 (2005); Vandenbergh, supra note 112, at 196; Michael P. 
Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1673, 1687–89 (2007). 
 117. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 541–84 (examining “individuals’ emissions of 
several important pollutants: low-level ozone or smog, mercury, several air toxics from 
mobile sources, pesticides, and petroleum”); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, 
at 1690–93 (analyzing “emissions attributable to personal motor vehicle use, personal air 
travel .	.	. mass transport.	.	.	. [and] household electricity use”). 
 118. See Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 91, at 1388 (describing the “one percent 
problem” as a situation “where small contributors account for so much of a regulatory 
problem that the social goal cannot be met without regulating many one percent 
sources”). 
 119. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 537–84 (reviewing contributions of 
individuals to various pollution problems and concluding that “individuals’ proportionate 
share may be growing”); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1693–95 
(estimating carbon emissions from individual behavior in the United States and their 
implications). 
 120. See Kuh, supra note 115, at 30–31 (“By focusing on commercial and industrial 
sources of pollution and resource consumption, core environmental statutes might be said 
to express the view that those commercial and industrial sources are polluters—to be 
condemned and curbed—while individuals are not.”); Vandenbergh, supra note 112, at 
204–11 (analyzing the potential social perceptions of environmental harm that command-
and-control policies created). 
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regulating smaller sources of GHGs.121 The EPA feared that literal 
application of the regulatory thresholds found in the Clean Air Act 
would require the issuance of 6.1 million permits and $21 billion in 
administrative costs.122 Accordingly, the EPA developed higher 
thresholds designed to require the issuance of only 15,000 permits and 
impose only $62 million in administrative costs.123 The centerpiece of 
the Obama Administration’s EPA’s GHG reduction efforts, the 2015 
Clean Power Plan,124 provides another example where individual 
behavior is neglected. This regulation focuses on reducing carbon 
pollution from power plants rather than on regulating other GHG-
generating behavior, including individual behavior, directly.125 
The pollutant releases and environmental harms caused by 
individuals do differ in important ways from those caused by 
industrial facilities.126 Pollutant releases by individuals come from 
more numerous sources and are often less than salient.127 
Environmental harms from individual behavior tend to be gradual, 
cumulative, and less obvious than those caused by industrial 
sources.128 Individual pollution is akin to pollution from other 
dispersed sources such as small businesses, family farms, or nonpoint 
sources.129 For dispersed sources of pollution, the large number of 
sources and their relative lack of familiarity with the regulatory 
system pose unique challenges for regulation, monitoring, and 
 
 121. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).  
 122. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2443 (2014). The Supreme 
Court found the EPA’s “rewriting of the statutory thresholds [to be] impermissible” but 
nevertheless upheld part of the Tailoring Rule under a different statutory provision. Id. at 
2445, 2448–49. 
 123. See id. at 2443. 
 124. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,622 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60). 
 125. Id. The Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, see West Virginia v. EPA, 
136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.), and the Trump Administration’s EPA intends to repeal it. 
Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,787, 51,787 (proposed Nov. 8, 2017); see also 
Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon 
Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate
/clean-power-plan.html [https://perma.cc/BP8W-TFNS (dark archive)]. 
 126. Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 589. 
 127. See id. at 589–90. 
 128. Id. at 590. 
 129. See Daniel A. Farber, Controlling Pollution by Individuals and Other Dispersed 
Sources, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10745, 10746 (2005). The federal Clean Water Act focuses on 
point sources of pollution and leaves regulation of nonpoint sources largely to the states. 
See HOLLY DOREMUS, ALBERT C. LIN & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY LAW 768–69 (6th ed. 2012).  
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enforcement.130 Moreover, whereas we can reasonably predict 
corporate behavior by assuming that corporations respond rationally 
to regulation and other incentives,131 individual behavior is more 
difficult to predict because of cognitive biases, social influences, and 
lack of information.132 
B. Options for Governing Individual Behavior 
Individual behavior may be more difficult to govern than 
industrial behavior, but it need not be ungovernable. Options for 
governing individual behavior include direct regulation, economic 
incentives, general permits, upstream regulation, social norms, and 
technological management. This Section describes each of these 
options and considers their relative merits. 
1.  Direct Regulation 
Conventional wisdom states that traditional methods of 
regulation are poorly suited for governing environmentally significant 
individual behavior.133 Pollution controls typically applied to 
industrial facilities may not work for small sources, and implementing 
controls against numerous sources may be too expensive, intrusive, or 
politically infeasible.134 Attempts to limit vehicle use in Los Angeles 
in the 1970s exemplify these difficulties.135 These efforts, which 
included gasoline rationing and other seemingly drastic measures, 
were abandoned after a vehement public reaction.136 Recent efforts to 
restrict lawn pesticide use and residential wood burning have 
sometimes encountered a similar response, resulting in them never 
going into effect.137 
 
 130. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10746. 
 131. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1739. 
 132. Id. at 1739. 
 133. See Kuh, supra note 116, at 1120 (“The existing literature’s relative inattention to 
direct mandates on environmentally significant individual behaviors stems from the 
perception that applying mandates to most environmentally significant individual 
behaviors would simply be infeasible.”). 
 134. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 597–98. 
 135. See id. at 555. 
 136. Craig N. Oren, How a Mandate Came from Hell: The Making of the Federal 
Employee Trip Reduction Program, 28 ENVTL. L. 267, 277–78 (1998). In recent years, 
congestion pricing has been adopted with some success in London, Singapore, and 
Stockholm, and it is now under serious consideration in New York City. See Christina 
Anderson et al., Should New York Look Abroad to Get Out of Its Traffic Jam?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2018, at A15. 
 137. Rachel Chason, Court Strikes Down Montgomery County’s Ban on Lawn 
Pesticides, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics
/judge-rules-against-controversial-montgomery-county-ban-on-lawn-pesticides/2017/08/03
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Counterexamples nonetheless demonstrate the feasibility of 
some direct regulation of individuals. State or local laws may prohibit 
littering or require individuals to conserve water, separate trash, or 
recycle electronic waste.138 Local zoning laws restrict what landowners 
can do on their land.139 Under certain circumstances federal law also 
restricts private land use, as through the Endangered Species Act’s 
“take” prohibition and the Clean Water Act’s wetlands permitting 
requirement.140 Monitoring of individual compliance may involve 
resource-intensive inspections or high-technology surveillance.141 To 
counter objections to direct regulation based on cost, inconvenience, 
or unfairness, policymakers may offer information, technical help, or 
other forms of compliance assistance.142 
Tort law also regulates individual behavior, albeit less directly 
than command-and-control regulation. While tort law provides an ex 
post remedy for damages, it also deters ex ante behaviors that could 
result in liability.143 Ordinarily, individual conduct is governed by the 
doctrine of negligence, which imposes a duty to take reasonable 
precautions against creating risks of injury to others.144 More 
demanding standards can apply in special circumstances, however. 
Strict liability applies to abnormally dangerous conduct or defective 
products, for example.145 And the existence of a “special 
relationship”—for example, as between landlord and tenant, or 
innkeeper and guest—also can give rise to a heightened duty of 
care.146 Regardless of the specific standard that may apply, the general 
 
/7350d7d2-7858-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html [https://perma.cc/9NE2-3WC5]; Brian 
Maffly, Wood-Burning Ban Coming off the Table, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 2, 2015, 9:46 
PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=2131384&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc
/6CMY-4S7V].  
 138. Kuh, supra note 116, at 1132–33. 
 139. Id. at 1161. 
 140. See id. at 1135–47 (describing the limits imposed on private behavior by the Clean 
Air Act, Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act). 
 141. See id. at 1134. 
 142. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 599. Many jurisdictions restrict the disposal 
of used motor oil or require recycling, for example, but they offer convenient drop-off 
options to reduce incentives for illegal disposal. See id. 
 143. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence 
and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1816–18, 1831 (1997); see also DAN B. 
DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 23 (2d ed. 2016). 
 144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §	6 
(Am. Law Inst. 2010); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 143, at 197–98. 
 145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §	20; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §	1 (Am. Law Inst. 1998); see 
also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 143, at 784, 804. 
 146. See Katz, supra note 87, at 1077–80 (discussing “assumptions that justify the 
common law treatment of ‘special relationships,’ and how these assumptions continue to 
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applicability of tort law makes it an important backstop to 
conventional regulation, particularly where new technologies and 
other changing circumstances can lead to regulatory gaps.147 
2.  Economic Incentives 
Government also can encourage environmentally positive 
behavior or discourage environmentally harmful behavior through 
subsidies or taxes, which are generally viewed as less coercive than 
command-and-control regulation.148 Subsidies and taxes are relatively 
straightforward to administer. Though subsidies may be more 
politically palatable than taxes, their financial tab can be a substantial 
barrier to adoption.149 Furthermore, subsidies—and taxes—may 
undermine environmental goals by framing environmental protection 
as a commodity rather than a moral responsibility.150 
Economic incentives also include emission allowance trading and 
similar market-based mechanisms, which have received much 
attention because of their potential to achieve environmental goals in 
a cost-effective manner.151 The utility of such mechanisms for 
regulating individual behavior may be limited, however. 
Administrative and transaction costs can be high, particularly when a 
large number of actors are involved, and these mechanisms require 
substantial data for successful implementation.152 
 
inform modern regulatory frameworks”). But cf. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 143, at 492 & 
n.291 (noting several cases where courts did not apply a strict liability standard to 
landlords). 
 147. See Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 
OR. L. REV. 381, 464–69 (2013); see also DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 129, at 40.  
 148. See William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: 
Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781, 803–04 (2010). See 
generally Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Environmental Regulation of Households: An 
Empirical Review of Economic and Psychological Factors, 66 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 559 
(2008) (reviewing effect of pricing and other mechanisms on household and individual 
behavior). 
 149. Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and 
Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 425–26 (2006). 
 150. See id. at 408, 431–33. 
 151. See Daniel P. Selmi, Federal Implementation Plans and the Path to Clean Power, 
28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 637, 652–53 (2016). 
 152. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 601 (noting that “environmental impacts of 
individual behavior are the product of very small, diffuse releases of pollutants .	.	. that are 
widely distributed among victims”). Notwithstanding these limitations, dispersed pollution 
sources are sometimes incorporated into a pollution trading regime through the use of 
offsets. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10752. Under an offset mechanism, regulated 
entities pay for pollution reductions by unregulated entities and are credited with offsets 
towards their own pollution emissions. Ensuring that offsets represent real reductions in 
emissions is often a challenge, however, particularly when the sources generating the 
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3.  General Permits 
General permits, which impose relatively light administrative 
burdens, are one means by which to tailor conventional command-
and-control approaches to dispersed pollution sources. Like an 
ordinary permit, a general permit contains enforceable pollution 
limits and permit conditions.153 But unlike an ordinary permit, a 
general permit applies to multiple sources, which obtain coverage 
under the permit simply by submitting a notice to the government or 
otherwise complying with permit conditions.154 The government may 
require a source covered by a general permit to apply for an 
individual permit if the source contributes significantly to pollution, 
violates the conditions of the general permit, or under other specified 
circumstances.155 
General permits have been widely used under the Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”).156 Section 404 of the CWA, which governs permits for 
discharging dredged or fill material into the waters of the United 
States, authorizes the issuance of general permits for activities that 
“are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental 
effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal 
cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”157 General permits 
have also been issued under section 402 of the CWA, which governs 
discharges of pollution into United States waters.158 The difficulty of 
 
offsets are dispersed and difficult to monitor. See Albert C. Lin, Myths of Environmental 
Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 45, 51 (2015). 
 153. See 40 C.F.R. §	122.28 (2017) (providing general permit requirements for various 
pollutants covered by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System); Steven G. 
Davison, General Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 35, 67–68 (2009); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under 
the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 410, 419 (2007). 
 154. See Gaba, supra note 153, at 410–11, 419 (describing general permits used under 
Clean Air Act regulatory scheme); see also Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 156 
(distinguishing between an exemption and a general permit in that the latter typically 
requires the filing of a form). A general permit also differs from an ordinary permit in that 
a general permit is developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than 
through individualized adjudication. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 165–66; Gaba, 
supra note 153, at 411. 
 155. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §	1344(e)(2) (2012) (permitting the government to revoke or 
amend a general permit if “such activities are more appropriately authorized by individual 
permits”); 40 C.F.R. §	122.28(b)(3) (allowing the EPA to require individual pollution 
permits under the Clean Water Act regulatory scheme). 
 156. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. §§	1251–1387).  
 157. 33 U.S.C. §	1344(e) (providing that general permits for dredged or fill material 
may be revoked or modified if activities have an adverse impact on the environment or are 
more appropriately authorized by individual permits). 
 158. See 33 U.S.C. §	1342; 40 C.F.R. §	122.28(a). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018) 
2018] HERDING CATS 973 
using individual permits to regulate discharges that are numerous and 
not readily subject to ordinary pollution control technology, such as 
storm sewer discharges, prompted the EPA to adopt the general 
permitting technique.159 
General permitting systems are less expensive and require less 
regulatory infrastructure than individual permitting systems.160 At the 
same time, general permitting systems can provide information that 
enables the government to conduct inspections and determine further 
regulatory needs.161 Although general permitting systems require 
agencies to make significant initial investments in a rulemaking 
process to establish each permit, they do not require as much 
oversight.162 Once a general permit issues, the agency need not 
conduct the assessment, negotiation, and review normally associated 
with each specific permit.163 The tradeoff is that general permitting 
systems do not allow for individualized assessments of harm.164 Thus, 
general permits are best suited for classes of activities with relatively 
predictable and uniform effects, and less so where individualized 
assessments would provide important information. A higher risk of 
environmental harm, or high levels of uncertainty regarding the risk 
of harm, may warrant use of specific permits instead.165 
One of the most significant reasons to use general permits is 
political: “General permits can allow for regulation with an especially 
light touch,” and thus may be particularly suited for governing 
“everyday activities” where there exists “a general expectation that 
the activity should be permitted.”166 If it turns out that those activities 
warrant more stringent regulation—perhaps because of increasing 
levels of activity or new information regarding harmful effects—the 
existence of a general permit might lay the groundwork for more 
expansive regulation.167 
 
 159. See Gaba, supra note 153, at 420–21, 429–30. 
 160. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 159, 165–66 (contrasting the process for 
obtaining a specific permit, which can involve “an enormous and expensive hassle,” and 
obtaining a general permit, which may “ask[] for only a name and an address [and] is a 
piece of cake”). 
 161. Id. at 156. 
 162. See id. at 169. 
 163. See id. at 169, 171. 
 164. General permitting under the CWA, for example, avoids the usual “site-specific 
assessment[s] that underlie[] compliance with various elements of water quality 
standards.” Gaba, supra note 153, at 433 (discussing how the EPA’s NPDES general 
permit program may violate requirements of the CWA). 
 165. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 178. 
 166. Id. at 198. 
 167. See id. at 218. 
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4.  Upstream Regulation 
Instead of directly regulating individual conduct, a government 
might influence individual behavior by regulating larger entities that 
supply the individuals or otherwise relate to individual behavior. By 
focusing on entities that are logistically easier to regulate, upstream 
regulation avoids the need to oversee and monitor numerous 
individual actors’ behavior.168 For example, imposing pollution 
standards on new car manufacturers is easier than restricting 
individual drivers or their pollution emissions.169 
Larger entities may serve as a source of leverage without 
necessarily restricting individual behavioral options.170 On their own, 
or in response to regulatory requirements, energy utilities employ 
demand response and energy efficiency programs to reduce peak 
demand or total electricity consumption.171 Through these programs, 
utilities offer customers economic incentives to alter how and when 
they consume electricity.172 Similarly, extended producer 
responsibility programs require electronics manufacturers to take 
back used electronics or to bear the financial responsibility for doing 
so.173 These programs incentivize, but do not require, individuals to 
act in environmentally responsible ways. 
Several factors may favor an upstream approach over direct 
regulation of individuals. When environmental harms are caused by 
dispersed sources, upstream regulation is generally more feasible and 
less costly because there are fewer entities to regulate.174 Upstream 
regulation can offer greater regulatory coverage to the extent that 
downstream regulation of some actors is simply not practicable.175 On 
 
 168. See Erin T. Mansur, Upstream Versus Downstream Implementation of Climate 
Policy, in THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF US CLIMATE POLICY 179, 184–85 
(Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram eds., 2012); Farber, supra note 129, at 10747. Here, 
downstream regulation refers to the regulation of entities whose conduct is of primary 
concern, whereas upstream regulation refers to regulation of parties further up the supply 
or production chain. See Mansur, supra, at 181. 
 169. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10747. 
 170. See id. at 10751–52. 
 171. See Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
457, 465–66 (2015). 
 172. See id. 
 173. Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility 
in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2006). 
 174. See TIM HARGRAVE, CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POL’Y, US CARBON EMISSIONS 
TRADING: DESCRIPTION OF AN UPSTREAM APPROACH 6 (1998), http://ccap.org/assets/US
-Carbon-Emissions-Trading-Description-of-an-Upstream-Approach_CCAP-March1998.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LC5B-F4NZ]. 
 175. See id. at 1 (noting that, unlike a downstream system, upstream system for carbon 
emission trading “would capture virtually all fossil fuel use and carbon emissions”). 
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the flip side, upstream regulation may provide weaker behavioral 
signals to individual actors than direct regulation downstream.176 
Exclusive reliance on upstream regulation also may result in missed 
opportunities for additional environmental gains.177 
5.  Activating or Shaping Norms 
Individual decisions are motivated not only by economic 
calculations but also by perceived social sanctions or rewards.178 
Social norms—spoken or unspoken rules that guide social behavior—
can powerfully influence individual conduct. Personal norms—
“informal obligations that are enforced through an internalized sense 
of duty to act, as well as guilt or related emotions for a failure to 
act”—also motivate behavior.179 The importance of norms to behavior 
suggests their potential utility in helping to manage the risks of 
distributed innovation.180 
Communities can put social pressure on individuals engaging in 
environmentally harmful behavior to conform to social expectations 
by drawing attention to such behavior and engaging with the 
individuals involved.181 Describing behavioral regularities and 
disseminating information regarding a behavior’s environmental 
impacts are specific techniques that rely on norms to prompt 
behavioral change.182 For example, some hotels encourage towel re-
use by describing the commonality of towel re-use or by invoking the 
environmental benefits of the practice.183 
 
 176. See id. (noting that upstream system for carbon emission trading would offer 
weaker “incentive[s] for energy efficiency and fuel switching” because of reliance on 
“price signal[s] rather than direct regulation”); see also Mansur, supra note 168, at 191 
(noting the proposition that “carbon price near the point of emissions .	.	. will make the 
policy more salient for the polluter and, therefore, result in greater response”). 
 177. Compare HARGRAVE, supra note 174, at 2 (noting possibility that “an upstream 
system [for carbon emission trading] .	.	. would provide no incentive to employ end use 
emissions treatment technologies”), with Mansur, supra note 168, at 181 (suggesting use of 
offsets in upstream regulation schemes to “reward firms for choosing to abate 
downstream”). 
 178. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 723 (2011). 
 179. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1706. 
 180. Tools relying on social norms are often more effective when used in combination 
with other mechanisms, such as financial incentives and technology mandates. See Michael 
P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The 
Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1754 (2008). 
 181. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10749–51. 
 182. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1707. 
 183. See Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, A Room with a 
Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. 
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The premise underlying these approaches is that recipients of 
information will individually determine that their behavior is 
inappropriate and then change their behavior accordingly.184 Because 
individuals often behave in accordance with perceived norms, 
presenting information regarding descriptive norms may correct 
misperceptions about actual behavior.185 Describing a behavior as 
common may not always lead to the desired behavioral change, 
though; increasing the awareness of descriptive norms could 
encourage those individuals who do not usually engage in undesirable 
but common behavior to start behaving this way more often.186 
Focusing on the harmful effects of individual behaviors, or on social 
disapproval of such behaviors, may help to activate norms regarding 
appropriate conduct.187 
Lack of information may be only one of several barriers to 
behavioral change.188 If individuals perceive behavioral change as 
inconvenient or ineffective, additional tools may be needed to 
counter that perception.189 Of particular interest are tools that build 
on behavioral scientists’ insights regarding cognitive biases and the 
 
CONSUMER RES. 472, 473–75 (2008) (finding the use of descriptive norms to be more 
effective than the invocation of environmental benefits in bringing about towel re-use). 
 184. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1705. For example, an 
“Individual Carbon-Release Inventory” might disclose data on carbon emissions from 
individuals and suggest behavioral changes with the goal of reducing carbon emissions. Id. 
at 1729–32. 
 185. See Kevin Burchell, Ruth Rettie & Kavita Patel, Marketing Social Norms: Social 
Marketing and the ‘Social Norm Approach’, 12 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 1, 5–6 (2013) (using 
descriptive norms “exploit[s] the fact that people tend to conform [their behavior] to what 
they understand to be the norm”); Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 752–54 (offering 
examples of groups effectively using descriptive norms to change individuals’ behavior). 
 186. See P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive 
Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 430 (2007). 
 187. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1709, 1729–31; see also Schultz 
et al., supra note 186, at 430, 432–33 (finding that combining descriptive information with 
an injunctive message reduced the tendency of descriptive norms to inadvertently increase 
levels of undesirable behavior among those who already abstain from such behavior). 
 188. See Philip K. Lehman & E. Scott Geller, Behavior Analysis and Environmental 
Protection: Accomplishments and Potential for More, 13 BEHAV. & SOC. ISSUES 13, 18 
(2004) (“[I]nformation alone is seldom sufficient to change behavior.”); Doug McKenzie-
Mohr, Promoting Sustainable Behavior: An Introduction to Community-Based Social 
Marketing, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 543, 547 (2000) (noting importance of identifying barriers to 
a desired behavior and explaining that these “barriers .	.	. may be internal .	.	. or external”). 
 189. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 754–55; see also DOUG MCKENZIE-
MOHR, FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY-
BASED SOCIAL MARKETING 41–127 (3d ed. 2011) (offering various strategies to enhance 
social marketing).  
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limitations of rational choice theory in predicting behavior.190 These 
tools include incentives, behavioral nudges—which seek to change 
people’s behavior “without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives”191—and other measures that 
lower the economic, social, or psychological costs of behavioral 
change.192 Asking individuals to make a commitment based on their 
beliefs, and subsequently reminding them of that commitment, can 
change behavior, particularly if the commitment is public and in 
writing.193 Similarly, frequent feedback can be an effective tool for 
influencing ongoing behavior.194 Such feedback might encourage 
individuals to engage in environmentally positive behaviors by 
quantifying such behaviors or describing their effect on the 
environment.195 
6.  Technological Management 
Technological management offers yet another approach to 
governing individual behavior. Technological management refers to 
“the design of products or places, or the automation of processes .	.	. 
seek[ing] to exclude .	.	. the possibility of certain actions.”196 Strictly 
speaking, technological management is not a legal tool. However, 
technological management functions like law by steering conduct in a 
desired direction or making certain conduct practically or physically 
impossible. Technological management of individual behavior 
typically occurs at the design or engineering stage. For example, 
 
 190. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 716–17; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1675, 1675 (noting that behavioral law and economics recognizes “that human behavior 
commonly deviates from predictions of rational choice theory”). 
 191. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008); see also Pierre Schlag, Nudge, 
Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 913, 915–16 (2010) 
(discussing default rules, “priming,” and other examples of behavioral nudges). 
 192. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 191, at 6–8; see also McKenzie-Mohr, supra 
note 188, at 548 (listing a variety of tools policymakers can use to create effective social 
marketing campaigns). 
 193. See MCKENZIE-MOHR, supra note 189, at 45–56; Lehman & Geller, supra note 
188, at 20; Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 759. Commitment strategies can require 
significant investments of resources to engage individuals, however. See MCKENZIE-
MOHR, supra note 189, at 54; McKenzie-Mohr, supra note 188, at 546–57. A less labor-
intensive strategy is to prompt individuals with oral or written messages stating desired 
behaviors. Lehman & Geller, supra note 188, at 19; see also MCKENZIE-MOHR, supra note 
189, at 83–87 (discussing the mechanics and examples of effective prompting). 
 194. Lehman & Geller, supra note 188, at 21–22; van den Bergh, supra note 148, at 568. 
 195. See Lehman & Geller, supra note 188, at 21–22. 
 196. Roger Brownsword, In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management, 7 
L. INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 8 (2015). 
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traffic engineers may narrow roads to reduce vehicle speeds and 
traffic volume,197 and manufacturers may include automatic shut-off 
features in appliances to reduce energy use.198 Software code serves as 
a form of technological management as well, regulating 
communications and interactions in cyberspace.199 In other cases, 
technological management may substitute directly for law, as 
illustrated by the potential for self-driving cars to make many 
highway safety laws superfluous.200 As the “Internet of Things”—the 
networking of physical devices to send and receive data—expands,201 
technological management will play an increasingly prominent role in 
governing individual behavior.202 
Technological management does not involve the same level of 
coercion as direct prohibition. Whereas a prohibition identifies what 
is not allowed and to whom the prohibition applies, technological 
management is more subtle. Such an approach may obscure the 
existence of regulation and its extent, and perhaps the identity of the 
regulator as well.203 These features may make technological 
management more politically feasible than direct regulation but also 
may raise concerns regarding political accountability and individual 
autonomy.204 
C. Governance of Small-Scale Activities in Developing Countries 
The challenge of regulating individual behavior is not confined to 
developed countries. In developing countries, small-scale actors are 
responsible for an especially large share of environmental harms. The 
challenge of regulating these small-scale activities is analogous to that 
posed by distributed innovation: numerous and widespread 
regulatory targets, limited government capacity to regulate directly, 
lack of awareness regarding environmental problems, and political 
 
 197. Reid Ewing & Eric Dumbaugh, The Built Environment and Traffic Safety: A 
Review of Empirical Evidence, 23 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 347, 355–56, 363 (2009). 
 198. Brownsword, supra note 196, at 24–25 (detailing potential product features that 
could control energy use and vehicle speed). 
 199. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 56–57, 72 (2006) (explaining the 
means by which software development and code can be used to regulate network users). 
 200. Brownsword, supra note 196, at 48. 
 201. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., DISRUPTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 4–6 (2013), https://www.sommetinter.coop/sites/default/files/etude/files
/report_mckinsey_technology_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/28UK-Y393].  
 202. See Brownsword, supra note 196, at 7 (“[T]echnological management promises to 
be the strategy of choice for public regulators of the present century.” (footnote omitted)). 
 203. See id. at 16; see also LESSIG, supra note 199, at 138 (“Code-based regulation .	.	. 
risks making regulation invisible.”). 
 204. See Brownsword, supra note 196, at 9–10. 
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resistance.205 To be sure, small-scale activities in developing countries 
have distinctive features—environmentally sloppy practices may be 
driven by poverty, and regulatory institutions may be especially weak 
or poorly supported206—but experience in managing these activities 
may nevertheless be instructive in managing distributed innovation. 
Addressing environmental problems caused by small-scale 
industrial activity in developing countries often involves the 
promotion of “cleaner production”—instilling less wasteful and more 
energy-efficient production processes that offer economic benefits for 
the target actor as well as safety and environmental benefits.207 
Barriers to adopting cleaner production methods may be attitudinal, 
organizational, technical, and economic.208 
One example of a small-scale activity with significant health and 
environmental impacts is the small-scale mining activity conducted by 
millions of people in developing countries. Small-scale mining 
operations often take place with minimal environmental safeguards 
because of financial limitations and a lack of information and 
oversight.209 Miners are often subject to toxic chemicals and 
dangerous work environments, and their operations contribute to 
mercury contamination, erosion, deforestation, and other forms of 
environmental degradation.210 Strategies for preventing and 
addressing such impacts include: adopting a licensing system tailored 
to small-scale operations; offering training and other educational 
initiatives; establishing formal organizations or regional centers to 
provide support and training; developing partnerships with large 
mining organizations to disseminate best practices; registering small-
scale operators with large-scale companies on whose properties they 
operate; and providing better ore-processing equipment.211 
 
 205. See Philip Andrews-Speed et al., The Regulation of China’s Township and Village 
Coal Mines: A Study of Complexity and Ineffectiveness, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 185, 
185 (2003); Jos Frijns & Bas van Vliet, Small-Scale Industry and Cleaner Production 
Strategies, 27 WORLD DEV. 967, 971 (1999). 
 206. See, e.g., Oliver Maponga & Clay F. Ngorima, Overcoming Environmental 
Problems in the Gold Panning Sector Through Legislation and Education: the Zimbabwean 
Experience, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 147, 155 (2003). 
 207. See Frijns & van Vliet, supra note 205, at 975. 
 208. See id. at 977–78. 
 209. See Benjamin N.A. Aryee, Bernard K. Ntibery & Evans Atorkui, Trends in the 
Small-Scale Mining of Precious Minerals in Ghana: A Perspective on Its Environmental 
Impact, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 131, 136 (2003). 
 210. See Gavin Hilson, Small-Scale Mining and Its Socio-Economic Impact in 
Developing Countries, 26 NAT. RESOURCES F. 3, 8–9 (2002). 
 211. See Aryee et al., supra note 209, at 137–39; Hilson, supra note 210, at 9–11; 
Wilfred C. Lombe, Editorial, Small Scale Mining and the Environment: Bloom Beyond the 
Doom and Gloom?, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 95, 96 (2003). Furthermore, the 
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What these strategies have in common is a “soft law” touch—
they shy away from complex regulation, strive to educate rather than 
coerce, and devolve power away from central government to local or 
private entities. A similar approach might also be effective in 
distributed-innovation contexts involving numerous actors who have 
limited information and resources. 
IV.  GOVERNING DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION 
Having reviewed various approaches for governing individual or 
small-scale behavior, we return to the challenge of governing 
distributed innovation. While some of the approaches for governing 
small-scale behavior offer useful suggestions, distributed innovation 
poses distinct difficulties for oversight. This Part discusses these 
difficulties and suggests three categories of options for distributed-
innovation governance: (1) a “Big Data/Big Government” approach; 
(2) an approach that relies on nongovernmental intermediaries for 
oversight; and (3) a self-regulatory approach. 
A. The Further Complexity of Governing Distributed Innovation 
The regulatory challenge presented by distributed innovation has 
much in common with the challenge posed by pollution from small-
scale sources. Both grapple with the difficulty of governing the 
conduct of parties that are numerous, unaccustomed to regulation, 
and largely outside the regulatory system. 
As compared with other forms of small-scale activity, distributed 
innovation possesses several characteristics that make governance 
especially complex. First, the effects of distributed innovation may be 
particularly uncertain because the activities at issue are new and 
constantly changing. A new activity may be easier to shape. The 
uncertainty of a new activity’s effects, however, may make it 
impossible for a government to determine if regulation is necessary in 
the first instance. Further, if a government does decide to regulate, 
some tools, such as information dissemination or specific permits, 
may be difficult to deploy effectively in the absence of accurate 
information. Second, distributed innovation confronts would-be 
regulators with moving targets. The innovation process is inherently 
dynamic. Consequently, setting up a permit system or other 
regulatory scheme predicated on current types, levels, and impacts of 
 
establishment of secure property rights to mineral land can provide an incentive to invest 
in knowledge and physical capital. See Knud Sinding, The Dynamics of Artisanal and 
Small-Scale Mining Reform, 29 NAT. RESOURCES F. 243, 244, 247, 251 (2005). 
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activity may not work. Third, the potential for catastrophic harms—as 
in the case of DIYbio212—suggests a small margin for regulatory error. 
For ordinary small-scale behaviors with cumulatively significant 
impacts, less-than-complete regulatory coverage and compliance may 
not prevent achievement of regulatory goals. In contrast, the failure 
to regulate a particular distributed innovator—for example, a DIY 
biologist engaging in the release of experimental organisms—may 
matter in ways that the failure to regulate a small-scale polluter may 
not. 
The distinctive characteristics of distributed innovation make it 
difficult to directly transplant techniques used to govern small-scale 
behavior in other contexts. Such techniques may be useful starting 
points for managing the risks of distributed innovation, but 
policymakers should conduct a context-specific analysis before 
choosing a particular course. Indeed, the distinctive features of 
distributed innovation—change, novelty, and potential for 
catastrophe—are among the qualities that have prompted scholars to 
turn from conventional regulation to the broader and more flexible 
notion of governance.213 Governance—the making and 
implementation of norms by public actors as well as businesses, 
nonprofit organizations, and other private actors214—offers a more 
sophisticated approach for responding to economic and social 
conditions that are often too complex, uncertain, volatile, and 
heterogeneous to be managed through conventional regulatory 
approaches.215 Examples of governance by private actors include 
accreditation and certification schemes, third-party monitoring and 
verification, and voluntary codes of conduct.216 Governance by private 
actors can bring additional societal resources to address problems and 
attract the support of key stakeholders.217 Private involvement, 
however, can also raise concerns regarding accountability and 
legitimacy.218 
 
 212. See supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 357–58 (2004). 
 214. See id. at 344; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal 
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 471, 474 (2004).  
 215. See Lobel, supra note 213, at 357–58. 
 216. See id. at 374–75; Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2012). 
 217. See Lester M. Salamon, The Tools Approach and the New Governance: 
Conclusion and Implications, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW 
GOVERNANCE 600, 602–03 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). 
 218. See id. at 602–05. 
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The concept of governance is consistent with Larry Lessig’s 
identification of law as just one of four possible “modalities of 
regulation.”219 Other modalities of regulation, according to Lessig, 
include: social norms, which communities, rather than governments, 
enforce; markets, which “regulate by price”; and architecture, which 
regulates by physically or virtually constraining an activity.220 These 
different modalities may operate simultaneously in an environment, 
interacting with and influencing each other.221 
In choosing from among these modalities or from among 
governance options, policymakers might consider criteria such as 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability, adaptability, political 
feasibility, and legitimacy.222 The objective here, however, is not to 
assess the ultimate desirability of any specific policy instrument 
according to these criteria. Rather, the criteria are presented as a 
starting point for government or nongovernmental entities as they 
consider options for addressing the risks of distributed innovation.223 
The importance of each factor will depend on context and on the 
priorities of decision makers and stakeholders.224 Effectiveness may 
be critical when a program is designed to address very serious or 
 
 219. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 501, 507 (1999). 
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the risky act.” Brownsword, supra note 196, at 10. 
 221. See Lessig, supra note 219, at 511–12. 
 222. See Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy 
Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMICS 395, 
399–401 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985) (identifying “[d]imensions for 
judging environmental policy instruments”); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance 
and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1647–50 
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Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory 
and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 464 (1992) (discussing potential criteria for 
analyzing policy). 
 223. As Sarah Light and Eric Orts have suggested in the context of global 
environmental governance, “there is no omniscient single ‘chooser’ of options”; rather, 
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NGOs, and individuals acting as both consumers and citizens.” Sarah E. Light & Eric W. 
Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
ADMIN. L. 1, 10–11 (2015). 
 224. See Robert M. Friedman, Donna Downing & Elizabeth M. Gunn, Environmental 
Policy Instrument Choice: The Challenge of Competing Goals, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 327, 327–28 (2000); see also Light & Orts, supra note 223, at 11 (“The 
appropriate governance solution for a particular problem will depend upon the specific 
context of a problem, available alternative tools, and a weighing of different normative 
considerations.”). 
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catastrophic risks,225 for example, whereas adaptability may receive 
special consideration when governance is at an early stage. 
B. Three Basic Approaches 
As the earlier discussion suggests, the policy literature offers a 
range of tools that could assist in the oversight of distributed 
innovation. Ultimately, these tools fall into three categories: (1) a 
“Big Data/Big Government” approach that takes advantage of Big 
Data advances to apply existing law or develop new regulatory 
programs; (2) an approach that relies heavily on nongovernmental 
intermediaries to serve as the frontline or primary means of oversight; 
and (3) a self-regulatory approach in which persons engaged in 
distributed innovation take on substantial responsibility for 
overseeing themselves. 
This typology and Lessig’s categorization of regulatory 
modalities226 do overlap in some ways: just as norms, markets, and 
architecture offer alternative modalities of regulation, 
nongovernmental intermediaries and private actors can substitute for 
government regulators. Lessig’s approach, however, is especially 
concerned with the means of regulation and focuses on architecture 
as an often-overlooked method.227 In contrast, the typology presented 
here zeroes in on the actor responsible for a constraint rather than the 
nature of the constraint. A primary focus on who does the governing, 
with a secondary focus on how the governing should be done, is 
appropriate because it prompts an inquiry into whether the entity is 
capable, accountable, and democratically responsible. Distributed 
innovation calls into question government’s ability to respond, and 
thus the question of “Who else might govern?” is a critical one. The 
challenge involves a matter of not only picking a different tool from 
the regulatory toolbox but also re-conceptualizing oversight and 
identifying alternative agents of governance. 
1.  Big Data/Big Government 
The “Big Data/Big Government” response to distributed 
innovation would capitalize on the huge quantities of data being 
 
 225. See Friedman et al., supra note 224, at 345. 
 226. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Demystifying Lessig, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 713, 
716–17. For further discussion of what Lessig means by “architecture,” see supra note 220 
and accompanying text. 
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produced and the growing capacity to collect and process it.228 In 
some areas, the same technologies that make distributed innovation 
possible also would facilitate government tracking and anticipation of 
distributed-innovation activities. For example, the digital advances 
that make the sharing economy possible also allow activities within 
that economy to be monitored, analyzed, and overseen. Where data 
collection is routine, one can readily imagine a regulatory scheme 
relying on that data. Government might then adapt existing 
regulations to account for the unique aspects of the new, innovative 
activity.229 
The specific steps government might take under a Big Data/Big 
Government approach will depend on a community’s values and the 
weighing of relevant tradeoffs.230 One relatively light-handed option 
would be to require general permits of small-scale operators rather 
than more onerous individual permits.231 Such an approach could hold 
operators to minimal standards while providing data to help 
regulators decide if more oversight is needed. Another option would 
be to use performance-based regulations, which would set regulatory 
standards but allow regulated entities flexibility in how they achieve 
specified results.232 Government could also undertake more 
comprehensive reform: rather than merely modifying existing 
schemes to account for distributed innovation’s unique features, 
 
 228. I use the term “Big Data” to refer generally to the collection, analysis, and use of 
large data sets as the basis for corporate or governmental decision-making. Various 
definitions of the term focus on the use of supercomputers to find patterns and generate 
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features of data. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data 
Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 794–97 (2015). 
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governments craft regulations for Airbnb); see also JANELLE ORSI ET AL., SHAREABLE & 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CTR., POLICIES FOR SHAREABLE CITIES: A SHARING 
ECONOMY POLICY PRIMER FOR URBAN LEADERS 15–16, 18–19, 21 (2013), 
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/6SHA-4NQY] (providing examples of local governments adapting existing policies or 
adopting new policies to incentivize innovations in urban farming and cottage food 
industries). 
 230. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 129–30. 
 231. See supra Section III.B.3; see also Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 232–33 
(suggesting the use of general permits for regulating sharing economy activity); Eric Biber 
& J.B. Ruhl, Regulating the “Sharing Economy,” REGULATORY REV. (July 28, 2014), 
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 232. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 24 (arguing that performance-based 
regulations would more effectively regulate the sharing economy than command-and-
control policies). 
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government might view distributed-innovation activity as an 
opportunity to modernize overall regulatory policies.233 
Adoption of a Big Data/Big Government regulatory approach 
may require government intrusion into activity that in some instances 
is considered personal or proprietary. Consequently, Big Data/Big 
Government approaches raise concerns regarding transparency, 
autonomy, and protection of privacy.234 Big Data collects data 
through opaque techniques, and the institutions that use the data hold 
tremendous power.235 Furthermore, technology concealing users’ 
identities may in some instances confound Big Data/Big Government 
approaches.236 
Notwithstanding such concerns, government likely will play a 
significant role in distributed-innovation oversight. Distributed 
innovation and any attendant harms will be the subject of intense 
public concern. Government possesses substantial resources to make 
and enforce the law, and it is authorized generally to represent the 
public. In at least some contexts, government will be the most 
effective protector of the public and public values, even if it cannot 
use conventional regulatory methods.237 
2.  Nongovernmental Intermediaries 
Governance includes a range of “actions taken by non-
governmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally 
governmental ends.”238 These actions may be legally mandated or 
purely voluntary. Private environmental governance includes self-
regulation, discussed in the next Section, and governance by 
nongovernmental intermediaries. Nongovernmental intermediaries 
often have information, skills, or resources the government lacks and 
may be able to act where jurisdictional gaps or other constraints 
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prevent government action.239 Unhindered by processes applicable to 
government decision-making, these entities may be able to develop 
and adapt programs rapidly in response to changing circumstances or 
local conditions.240 
Examples of private environmental governance by 
nongovernmental intermediaries include eco-labeling and 
certification systems, lending standards, environmental management 
standards, and supply chain contracts.241 Many of these examples 
involve large corporations, which can serve as a fulcrum of leverage 
over those who depend on them, such as small suppliers.242 But 
private governance efforts are not limited to large corporations. 
Insurers, banks, certification organizations, industry associations, and 
nonprofits are just some of the entities that exercise regulatory 
authority over private activity.243 Such entities may monitor and 
challenge industry behavior, gather and disseminate information, or 
cooperate with industry to establish and implement standards of 
conduct.244 
Of course, the goals and agendas of nongovernmental entities 
may not coincide with the public interest.245 Private entities may adopt 
governance measures in an effort to ward off more restrictive public 
regulation.246 Nongovernmental intermediaries may be interested 
primarily in cultivating more business or burnishing their reputations. 
Furthermore, various constitutional and statutory obligations 
designed to foster openness, accountability, fairness, and public 
participation do not apply to nongovernmental actors.247 To counter 
such concerns, nongovernmental entities may disclose information 
voluntarily or adopt other quasi-public measures. Active government 
 
 239. See id. at 161; see also Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party 
Governance 2 (June 2004) (unpublished paper prepared for the 20th Anniversary 
Structure and Organization of Government Research Committee of the International 
Political Science Association), http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/campbell/sog-conf/papers/sog2004-
posner.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4SW-UHV2]. 
 240. See Posner, supra note 239, at 2. 
 241. See Vandenbergh, supra note 238, at 148–61. 
 242. See id. at 168–69. 
 243. See Salamon, supra note 222, at 1613–14. 
 244. See Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Persistence of the Public/Private Divide in 
Environmental Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 199, 218–19 (2014). 
 245. See Posner, supra note 239, at 15. 
 246. See Vandenbergh, supra note 238, at 186–87. 
 247. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1301–02 (2003) (noting a group’s concern “about privatization’s 
implications for what they regard as liberal democratic norms of accountability, due 
process, equality, rationality, and the like”); Posner, supra note 239, at 7 (“Third party 
providers have independent bases of political power .	.	.	.”). 
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oversight of nongovernmental intermediaries also can provide a 
measure of accountability and bring pressure to align intermediaries’ 
interests with those of the general public.248 
Reliance on nongovernmental intermediaries may be combined 
with government regulation. Take, for example, upstream regulation, 
in which government directly regulates larger entities that in turn 
influence behavior by smaller entities or individuals.249 Upstream 
regulation makes particular sense in the case of repeat players, who 
not only have greater regulatory sophistication but also face stronger 
incentives to correct externalities and comply with regulatory 
requirements.250 Unsurprisingly, regulatory efforts in the distributed 
innovation context have focused on Uber, Airbnb, and 3D-printer 
manufacturers rather than on occasional Uber drivers, Airbnb hosts, 
or 3D-printer users.251 These repeat players generally are easier to 
track and can adopt precautions against risk at the lowest cost.252 
3.  Self-Regulation 
Government may rely on industry members to regulate 
themselves when it lacks sufficient information, political will, or 
resources to regulate effectively.253 Compared with government, the 
industry or community to be regulated often has superior information 
regarding risks and risk-reduction strategies.254 Industry can often 
monitor and control its own operations more effectively than 
 
 248. See McAllister, supra note 216, at 32–33. 
 249. See supra Section III.B.4. 
 250. See Cannon & Chung, supra note 237, at 35 (discussing “incentives gap” between 
inexperienced sharing economy actors with little incentive “to self-impose an optimal level 
of forethought and safeguards” and platform developers and government regulators with 
long-term incentives to correct market inefficiencies). 
 251. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 73, at 922–24 (discussing local government 
efforts to regulate “non-professional” services by regulating the sharing economy 
platforms). 
 252. See Katz, supra note 87, at 1101–03 (explaining why sharing platforms, not service 
providers, are “either the least-cost avoider or the easiest target for enforcement 
agencies”). 
 253. See Jodi L. Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or “Bad 
Moon”?, 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 27–28 (2013) (identifying 
knowledge voids, political voids, and institutional voids as the three types of “regulatory 
voids” self-regulation typically is meant to address). 
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(1995). 
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outsiders.255 And in rapidly changing environments, industry can often 
better anticipate developments and more readily adjust standards.256 
As with governance through nongovernmental intermediaries, 
self-regulation need not be exclusive of other forms of governance. 
Self-regulation may be voluntary, formulated in response to the 
threat of government regulation, or sanctioned by the government.257 
Government might even mandate self-regulation by setting 
overarching goals and then allowing industry to determine and 
implement standards to achieve those goals.258 Often, self-regulation 
is part of a complex regulatory environment in which public and 
private actors cooperate in creating and implementing rules.259 
Understandably, self-regulation carries some negative 
connotations. The metaphor of the fox guarding the hen house 
reflects the serious concerns regarding self-interested behavior, lack 
of transparency, and dubious accountability.260 Self-regulation, 
however, typically involves more than a company policing itself. The 
term often refers to a group of industry peers or a professional 
association regulating behavior.261 Indeed, effective self-regulation 
may require a network of relationships within an industry.262 Even 
then, additional safeguards may be necessary for self-regulation to be 
fair and effective. Participation by independent third parties, public 
scrutiny, professional norms, and the threat of government regulation 
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all can motivate compliance with self-regulatory approaches and 
lessen accountability concerns.263 
Oversight of distributed innovation is characterized precisely by 
the informational challenges, implementation difficulties, and 
changing conditions that make self-regulation an attractive alternative 
to conventional governmental regulation. In all likelihood, the very 
communities that participate in distributed innovation will be central 
to managing distributed innovation’s risks. These groups obviously 
influence how a technology develops and what risks arise as they 
share information and disseminate a technology.264 But these 
communities will also have a more direct role in risk management. To 
some extent, these groups police themselves and punish violators of 
community norms through a range of techniques, including 
reputational sanctions, cyber vigilantism, and denial of access to 
community goods.265 These communities can share expert knowledge 
with the government and provide insight into the effectiveness of 
potential oversight mechanisms.266 Furthermore, distributed-
innovation communities can be especially valuable contributors to 
risk management efforts because they often are not bound by the 
physical, legal, temporal, and geographic constraints that apply to 
conventional government oversight.267 
V.  GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION 
This Part considers how various governance options are 
beginning to appear—or might be further applied—in the specific 
contexts of DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing economy. Given 
distributed innovation’s varied forms and the challenges it poses for 
conventional regulation, the variety of governance approaches is 
unsurprising. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges 
posed by distributed innovation. Going forward, those engaged in 
governance efforts will wrestle with competing objectives of 
encouraging innovation, protecting people and the environment, and 
safeguarding privacy and democratic values. 
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A. DIYbio 
1.  The Current Approach: Primarily Self-Regulation 
To date, governance of DIYbio has relied heavily on a form of 
self-regulation. Community labs have played a critical role in 
addressing potential hazards. DIYbio participants in these labs have 
formulated ethical principles, and the DIYbio community has 
partnered with the FBI to learn about and identify potential threats. 
Thus, the current approach relies on norms and architecture rather 
than law. 
Much—but not all—DIYbio activity takes place in community 
labs.268 Community labs generally regulate access and lab materials.269 
Lab directors, who might face legal liability should problems arise, 
typically “evaluate each new member and their project for safety.”270 
Lab directors also approve the introduction and removal of materials 
from the lab.271 Further, community labs typically require BSL-1 lab 
conditions, which do not allow for work with disease-causing 
organisms.272 Persons working in BSL-1 conditions must follow basic 
lab safety practices and adhere to established codes of conduct.273 
Insurers—a nongovernment intermediary—also play a governance 
role by requiring documented adherence to safety rules.274 
In a further effort to instill a culture of safety, the DIYbio 
community has developed rudimentary ethics codes.275 Participants in 
a 2011 conference of DIYbio groups drafted a code that outlines 
principles in seven areas, including open access, safety, and the 
environment.276 Nevertheless, the principles are rather general and, 
without further elaboration, may be too vague to provide concrete 
guidance in specific situations. For example, the principle governing 
 
 268. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 6. Even if DIY biologists do not work 
specifically in a community lab, they typically work in “group spaces” instead of in 
isolation. See id. at 9 (“92 percent of DIYers work in group spaces. These split between 
community labs, group labs solely devoted to biotechnology, and electronics hackerspaces 
that house DIYbio labs.”). 
 269. See id. at 19. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. at 15. 
 273. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 33, at 30–32 
(outlining BSL-1 “standard practices”).  
 274. See Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 124. 
 275. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 14; Draft DIYbio Code of Ethics from North 
American Congress, DIY BIO, https://diybio.org/codes/code-of-ethics-north-america-
congress-2011/ [https://perma.cc/5RMR-E4JS]. 
 276. Draft DIYbio Code of Ethics from North American Congress, supra note 275. 
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safety simply states, “[a]dopt safe practices.”277 Similarly, the principle 
governing the environment declares: “Respect the environment.”278 
Nonetheless, advisory boards of community labs can expand upon 
these principles in specific contexts. A web portal, “Ask a Biosafety 
Expert,” is also available to offer advice.279 
A partnership with the FBI has enhanced and supplemented the 
DIYbio community’s self-regulatory efforts to address biosecurity 
risks.280 Mindful of potential biosecurity risks but also worried that a 
heavy-handed approach might drive DIYbio activity underground, 
the FBI established an outreach program.281 Through the program, 
the FBI sought to gain the trust of DIYbio members and to secure 
their assistance as potential informants.282 As the FBI’s relationship 
with the DIYbio community grew, the FBI convinced the community 
that collaboration with the FBI would counter a growing public 
mistrust of community lab experiments, while DIY biologists 
persuaded the FBI that their community lab activities generally pose 
a minimal threat to biosecurity.283 The resulting partnership has 
provided the government with access to expertise and assistance in 
policing potential threats at a relatively low cost.284 
Further consideration of the ability of community labs to govern 
DIYbio’s risks is appropriate, given their central role. By analogy, 
one might look to more well-established research institutions that 
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 283. See Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 833–45; see also DELFANTI, supra note 
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been wary of the FBI’s overtures. See Howard Wolinsky, The FBI and Biohackers: An 
Unusual Relationship, 17 EMBO REPS. 793, 793–95 (2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
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 284. See Snow, supra note 1, at 64–65; see also Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 
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perform similar oversight functions for professional scientists. 
Unfortunately, oversight by such institutions raises concerns 
regarding whether professional scientists—let alone DIY biologists—
operate with adequate safeguards. University and corporate research 
institutions have lab rules, local oversight committees, and other 
mechanisms to foster responsible practices and address potential 
risks.285 However, even these institutions sometimes lack the 
expertise, independence, and authority to regulate effectively.286 
Deficiencies in preparedness, training, and adherence to safety 
protocols periodically contribute to serious accidents in these 
institutional settings.287 Indeed, a 2014 National Academy of Sciences 
report noted that some researchers view safety practices “as a barrier 
to research progress and a violation of their academic freedom.”288 It 
would not be surprising for such views also to exist within the DIYbio 
community, which espouses as a core value the freedom to 
experiment outside of traditional research settings.289 
In response to such concerns, DIY biologists point to a culture of 
openness and responsibility. Codes of conduct and community-based 
oversight can help guard against mishaps and deliberate misuse of the 
technology.290 Further, the FBI’s outreach program enables some 
monitoring of DIYbio’s biosecurity risks, though perhaps not its 
ecological risks.291 Nonetheless, the self-identification of many 
DIYbio practitioners as “biohackers”292 suggests the difficulty of 
effective control through such efforts. Hacker culture, though 
heterogeneous and dynamic, is generally characterized as having a 
“communal ethos .	.	. with values such as free sharing of information 
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and knowledge, and peer recognition.”293 In general, these features 
could enable codes of conduct to work.294 Yet also prominent in 
hacker culture are distrust of authority, rebellion against established 
institutions, and opposition to code restrictions.295 Any form of 
external oversight—whether through government regulation, 
community lab rules, or codes of conduct—may be viewed as contrary 
to the hacker ethos. Nor are such attitudes limited to DIY biologists 
tinkering with lab experiments. Bio-artists, who use DIYbio to create 
living works of art, may similarly oppose rules and instead seek fame, 
or notoriety, through shocking creations.296 
DIYbio’s antiestablishment approach is expressed primarily “as 
a challenge to BigBio—the ensemble of big corporations, global 
universities and international and government agencies that compose 
the economic system of current life sciences.”297 But the same attitude 
could be turned against the DIYbio community itself, which one 
biohacker has described as “hierarchical and exclusive.”298 Moreover, 
the hacker culture embraces widespread participation and the 
unencumbered pursuit of research.299 In the context of DIYbio, 
anyone with the desire and enthusiasm to tinker with DNA is invited 
to engage in experimentation, to “just do it”—no PhD, peer-review 
process, or expert committee oversight required.300 
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As the technology becomes cheaper and easier to use, DIYbio is 
unlikely to remain confined in community labs. Already, one DIY 
biologist is marketing a $120 gene modification kit for home use that 
incorporates the powerful CRISPR gene-editing technology.301 While 
its applications are limited, the kit foreshadows potential future 
developments.302 Moreover, as even codes of conduct advocates 
concede, “community norms will have little effect on the behaviour of 
rogue individuals who are intent on causing mischief or harm.”303 
Community lab oversight and other forms of self-regulation may 
be especially deficient in addressing ecological concerns. Inherent in 
DIYbio is a quest to improve upon nature.304 Further, as noted above, 
DIYbio promotes experimentation outside of conventional 
constraints. In this cultural context, DIY biologists might well pass 
over ecological concerns, notwithstanding the code of conduct’s 
admonition to “respect the environment.”305 The developers of the 
Glowing Plant project made statements exemplifying this casual 
attitude towards the natural environment. Without consulting any 
ecologists, the developers declared that widespread release of the 
engineered plants would cause no environmental harm.306 And in 
response to an interview query regarding the desirability of a 
completely bioengineered world, one co-developer simply remarked 
that the world is already engineered.307 Such sentiments suggest the 
limitations of a community lab-centered approach and the need to 
consider additional means of governance. 
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96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018) 
2018] HERDING CATS 995 
2.  Applying Big Data/Big Government and Nongovernment 
Intermediary Approaches to DIYbio 
At first glance, applying a Big Data/Big Government approach to 
DIYbio would seem daunting. Overseeing DIYbio research activity is 
inherently more difficult than overseeing research in universities, 
corporate laboratories, and other institutions.308 The prospect of 
keeping genetic material secure in a limited number of controlled 
environments, while plausible in the past, appears no longer feasible 
in light of technological advances.309 The FBI has avoided an 
aggressive law-and-order approach in order to avoid driving DIYbio 
activity underground,310 and no obvious technology exists to detect 
whether someone is engaging in DIYbio within the confines of his or 
her own home. 
Nonetheless, a Big Data/Big Government approach may be 
practicable. Such an approach may include, for example, mandates 
for biosafety training or personal liability insurance or a requirement 
that DIY biologists register with the government.311 Creating a 
registry for DIY biologists would be a sensible first step.312 A registry 
would gather information regarding who is engaging in DIYbio and 
how they are engaging in it while imposing limited burdens on DIY 
biologists and the government. A registration requirement could be 
enforced by prohibiting suppliers from selling CRISPR kits and other 
genetic material to unregistered persons.313 Having additional 
information about ongoing DIYbio activity would enable better 
assessment of potential risks and the need to develop further 
measures. 
Such a registry might resemble the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) registry for small unmanned aircraft (i.e., 
drones).314 In response to a congressional mandate to integrate 
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system,315 the FAA 
developed registration requirements to enable rapid identification of 
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 309. See Palmer et al., supra note 286, at 1471. 
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drones and to educate drone owners on safety requirements.316 
Concluding that the paper-based registration requirements generally 
applicable to aircraft owners would be too onerous if applied to small 
drone operators, the FAA developed a streamlined, web-based 
registration process specific to small unmanned aircraft owners.317 
Any person who owns an unmanned aircraft between fifty-five 
hundredths of a pound and fifty-five pounds must comply with 
registration requirements.318 Registered owners are assigned a 
registration number, which must be marked on all aircraft,319 and 
must provide proof of registration if requested by law enforcement or 
the FAA.320 Owners are not required to take a test or otherwise prove 
they know how to operate a drone, however.321 
Experience with drone registration to date suggests that 
enforcing an analogous registration requirement for DIYbio would 
face significant challenges. Notwithstanding the threat of substantial 
civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance, hundreds of thousands 
of drone owners apparently missed the registration deadline.322 The 
FAA has encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to 
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assist in detecting and enforcing against unauthorized drone 
operations,323 but these agencies’ resources are limited. 
For DIYbio, a possible locus for enforcing a registration 
requirement is DNA synthesis companies, which could limit sales to 
registered persons.324 Such an approach would combine a Big 
Data/Big Government approach with reliance on nongovernmental 
intermediaries. The federal government already encourages DNA 
synthesis companies to screen customers to confirm their identity and 
to screen gene sequences against a limited database of toxins and 
dangerous biological agents.325 The viability of enforcing registration 
requirements through DNA synthesis companies assumes limited 
access to DNA synthesizers, however. Such an assumption is 
increasingly questionable in an era when DIY biologists can order 
custom DNA sequences on the internet or buy their own desktop 
DNA synthesizers.326 
Community labs also could insist on registration as a condition of 
access. The FBI’s outreach efforts already have laid a foundation for 
further collaboration with the DIYbio community. Community labs 
generally have expressed a desire to demonstrate to the public that 
they are operating safely,327 so they might volunteer to enforce a 
registration requirement. Although enforcement through community 
labs would not reach lone-wolf experimenters, it could play an 
important role in registering most DIY biologists. 
Another possible enforcement locus is the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, which could require DIYbio patent applicants 
 
 323. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 320, at 5–7. 
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to prove they have fulfilled all legal requirements for conducting 
DIYbio activity before issuing a patent.328 This potential enforcement 
mechanism seems less promising, however, as it would reach only 
those persons who go forward with the patenting process. Relatively 
few DIY biologists are likely to seek patents, given the movement’s 
ethos of open access and its general hostility to intellectual property 
regimes.329 Would-be bioterrorists, amateurs who simply want to 
tinker, and open source enthusiasts would be indifferent to the threat 
of unpatentability. 
Government also could adopt approaches that incorporate 
financial incentives, for example, by funding DIYbio labs. Subsidies 
are frequently used to incentivize activities that provide public 
benefits,330 and conditions placed on government funding recipients 
historically have played an important role in research oversight. 
Government-sponsored DIYbio labs could provide data to the 
government and enable oversight, while at the same time encouraging 
innovative experimentation.331 Moreover, inexpensive access to such 
labs may help keep DIYbio outside of private spaces where unsafe or 
unsupervised experiments may be more likely.332 Political support for 
government-funded DIYbio labs, however, may be hard to come by if 
public benefits are not obvious.333 Furthermore, DIYbio practitioners, 
sensitive to threats to freedom of inquiry, may view any government 
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involvement as a threat to co-opt their movement.334 Persons seeking 
to avoid government oversight through these labs might turn to 
crowdfunding or other forms of private sponsorship.335 In addition, 
the declining costs of DIYbio experimentation will allow some to 
fund their own labs rather than rely on government facilities. 
Finally, it may eventually be possible to incorporate controls 
through code. DIY biologists someday could find it easier to work 
with standardized biological systems rather than to start projects from 
scratch.336 If so, security features might be incorporated into 
components used by DIY biologists.337 Similarly, synthetic biologists 
might one day design a genetic code containing synthetic nucleic 
acids, use of which would prevent genetic interactions with natural 
biological systems.338 Other proposed biological containment 
mechanisms include the development of organisms dependent on 
artificial substances not found in nature.339 The nongovernment 
intermediaries who design these mechanisms essentially would 
function as gatekeepers or risk managers for DIY biologists’ 
experiments involving these mechanisms. For now, however, such 
mechanisms are best described as speculative, and even if eventually 
developed, they would have their own limitations and risks.340 
In sum, a registration requirement for DIY biologists would be a 
relatively undemanding way for the government to gather 
information regarding ongoing activity and determine the need for 
additional oversight. Enforcing such a requirement through 
community labs and suppliers of genetic materials would build on 
existing procedures and enable coverage of most DIY biologists. 
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B. 3D Printing 
1.  A Potential Big Data/Big Government Approach 
3D printing is presently subject to little oversight, with the 
exception of specific classes of products such as drugs and medical 
devices that are subject to regulation regardless of how they are 
made.341 Technological advances, however, could enable application 
of a Big Data/Big Government approach to 3D-printed products. For 
example, researchers have reverse-engineered 3D-printed objects 
using sounds emitted by a 3D printer.342 3D-printing activity generates 
not only sound but also a thermal profile and electromagnetic 
radiation, each of which provides potential clues regarding the object 
being printed.343 Surveillance of 3D-printing activity could also rely on 
other ways to gather data, as 3D printers typically have cameras and 
connections to Wi-Fi networks.344 Users generally conduct at least 
some part of their activity online, whether uploading or downloading 
digital files, sending files to a maker-hub, or using cloud-based design 
software.345 As a result, government has multiple potential entry 
points for monitoring and regulating 3D-printing activity. 
A Big Data/Big Government approach could involve mere 
surveillance or more direct regulation. Direct regulation might focus 
on the possession of digital files for manufacturing a dangerous object 
or on the possession of the object itself.346 3D printing relies on digital 
files that could be tracked—at least in theory. Alternatively, a license 
might be required to own a 3D printer or to introduce 3D-printed 
objects into commerce.347 Enforcement of such requirements may be 
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difficult, however. In some instances, the targets of data collection or 
regulatory efforts may be able to mask information by creating 
physical barriers to detection, inserting white noise, or encrypting 
digital files.348 
Moreover, as is often true of a Big Data/Big Government 
approach, government surveillance of 3D printing could be intrusive 
or even unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held that the use of 
thermal imaging to measure heat emanating from a home is a search 
governed by the Fourth Amendment.349 Inside and outside the home, 
however, many unanswered questions remain regarding how the 
Fourth Amendment might apply to various technologies.350 Efforts to 
regulate possession of information would likely run into First 
Amendment objections as well.351 
Furthermore, a too-aggressive Big Data/Big Government 
approach could backfire by driving activity underground. For 
example, as a result of the Department of State’s efforts to restrict 
online publication of 3D-printed gun designs, “online groups that had 
been openly discussing 3D printing firearms suddenly instituted 
private chat rooms, deleted comments on how to meet existing gun 
laws or ways to circumvent the law, and began looking to encryption 
programs or Dark Web servers sponsored by foreign entities to 
escape US jurisdiction.”352 In this instance, heavy-handed regulation 
complicated information gathering, decreased users’ willingness to 
cooperate with the government, and arguably hastened further 
dissemination of 3D-printed gun designs.353 
A similar reaction likely would follow stringent government 
efforts to limit the distribution or printing of other 3D designs. Like 
their counterparts in the DIYbio community, many 3D-printing 
enthusiasts subscribe to the hacker ethic and generally oppose 
restrictions on their activities.354 “Information wants to be free”—a 
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notion that underlies digital file sharing practices and permeates the 
internet generally—is a popular theme in the world of 3D printing, 
heralding for some the democratization of invention and 
production.355 Accordingly, 3D-printer users would likely resist 
regulation and develop mechanisms to circumvent it. 
2.  Nongovernmental Intermediaries 
Ultimately, reliance on intermediaries is likely to be an 
important element of any 3D-printing oversight. Websites or other 
entities that host and distribute information could be involved in 
policy development, information gathering, standard setting, and 
enforcement.356 Indeed, enforcement of any limitations on publishing 
or disseminating 3D-printing files would be far easier against these 
entities than against individual website users.357 For example, 
Thingiverse, a widely used website for sharing digital design files, has 
an “acceptable use” policy that forbids users from collecting or 
distributing any content that violates a third party’s intellectual 
property right or that “promotes illegal activities or contributes to the 
creation of weapons, illegal materials or is otherwise 
objectionable.”358 While websites might adopt such policies on their 
own, government also might mandate that website owners remove 
certain types of files under a notice-and-takedown regime similar to 
that applied to copyrighted material under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.359 Websites beyond the jurisdiction of the United 
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States would likely be able to evade such a mandate, however.360 In 
addition, just as peer-to-peer networks for sharing digital music files 
undermined copyright enforcement efforts aimed at intermediaries, 
users would likely develop mechanisms to circumvent 3D-printing 
mandates aimed at website intermediaries.361 
Another possible locus of oversight is at the level of 3D-printer 
manufacturers. Requiring manufacturers to incorporate mechanisms 
to reduce health and safety hazards would be one logical mandate. 
But printer manufacturers could be asked to address concerns 
regarding counterfeit or dangerous 3D-printed objects as well. For 
example, manufacturers might be required to build 3D printers such 
that they embed a traceable identifier, such as a pattern of 
microbubbles, within all 3D-printed objects they create.362 
Alternatively, 3D-printer software could require an identification 
code in order to print a file or could block the printing of certain 
types of files.363 Such architecture-based efforts to limit the printing 
capability of 3D printers, however, may encounter resistance from 
users and manufacturers and prove vulnerable to hacking.364 In 
addition, the ability of individuals to construct 3D printers on their 
own365 could render such oversight ineffectual. 
3.  Self-Regulation 
Finally, self-regulation by 3D-printer users offers another, 
perhaps less promising, option for managing risks. Self-regulation 
might take the form of restrictions embedded within code or 
voluntary guidelines developed and disseminated by companies or 
individuals engaged in 3D printing.366 For example, one commentator 
has proposed that users follow a norm of taking a screenshot of an 
item before printing it in order to promote transparency and 
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accountability.367 Nevertheless, in the instances when oversight is 
most needed—such as the printing of contraband—users are unlikely 
to follow such a norm. Furthermore, community-based oversight, 
which offers an external check on undesirable DIYbio activity, is less 
likely to be an effective check on undesirable 3D printing. Currently, 
most DIYbio activity occurs in community labs, making it subject to 
the formal and informal oversight of others. 3D printing, in contrast, 
can be undertaken more readily by individuals lacking technical 
expertise and within the privacy of one’s home.368 Thus, community–
based oversight and norms are less likely to be successful in such a 
context. 
Ultimately, a Big Data/Big Government approach to governing 
3D printing may be tempting to adopt, but it would encounter 
significant practical and constitutional limitations. Websites and other 
nongovernmental intermediaries may serve as more effective and 
adaptable channels for governing 3D-printing products. In addition, 
to address the health and environmental impacts of the 3D-printing 
process, regulation of manufacturers may be necessary. 
C. Sharing Economy 
1.  Experimenting with a Big Data/Big Government Approach 
Of the distributed-innovation examples examined in this Article, 
the sharing economy is perhaps most susceptible to a Big Data/Big 
Government approach. Transactions in the sharing economy leave a 
digital trail that cash transactions do not.369 Indeed, data collection 
and exchange are at the heart of the digital platforms that undergird 
the sharing economy. Though private digital platforms themselves 
collect and generate the data, governments could demand—and 
increasingly are demanding—the data for their own use. 
A brief review of Uber’s data collection practices hints at the 
vast quantity and range of information available. First, Uber collects 
personal information directly from each user.370 Such information 
includes a user’s name, email, phone number, postal address, and 
photo.371 Furthermore, Uber collects usage information in a number 
of categories: contact information, including names and addresses in a 
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user’s address books; information regarding a user’s mobile devices; 
IP addresses, app features used, pages viewed, and other information 
available on server logs; credit card numbers and other transaction 
information; and information regarding a user’s location.372 
Controversy has surrounded Uber’s handling of user data, raising 
concerns regarding the company’s use of the data, employee access to 
the data, data breaches, and user privacy.373 Unsurprisingly, 
government officials have taken notice of Uber’s treasure trove of 
data. State and local regulators, airport authorities, and law 
enforcement officials regularly request information from Uber about 
specific trips, trip routes, trip requests, vehicles, riders, and drivers.374 
Governments have made liberal use of such data to enact 
regulatory schemes tailored to sharing-economy transactions. For 
example, local jurisdictions have adopted a variety of approaches to 
regulate pre-arranged transportation services.375 Notably, these 
regulations largely focus on the transportation network companies 
(“TNCs”), such as Uber, that match drivers and passengers. For the 
most part, TNCs—and not individual drivers—are responsible for 
conducting criminal background checks, providing proof of insurance, 
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and meeting other regulatory requirements.376 Short-term residential 
rentals have also attracted the regulatory attention of local 
governments, which in some cases have created new oversight 
schemes tailored to these markets.377 These schemes tend to impose 
regulatory requirements on both the hosts offering the rental and the 
web platforms through which rentals are arranged.378 
The development of regulatory regimes tailored to specific 
sharing-economy activities suggests an increasingly adaptive and 
experimental approach to government regulation. Other tools 
reflecting such an approach include: temporary waivers or exemptions 
from regulation, which allow economic activity to continue while 
regulators gather information and gain experience; sunset or 
regulatory review provisions, which require regulators to revisit 
standards previously adopted; and pilot programs, which test a 
regulatory approach on a small scale prior to broader 
implementation.379 The devolution of policy questions to local 
governments, which has allowed municipalities to adopt a variety of 
regulatory responses to Airbnb and Uber, itself demonstrates an 
experimental approach to governance that exemplifies Justice 
Brandeis’s laboratories of democracy.380 
A Big Data/Big Government approach could be applied not only 
to sharing-economy activities but also to the innovation process 
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insurance policies). 
 377. See Miller, supra note 70, at 184–95 (describing efforts to regulate short-term 
residential rental market). Some jurisdictions have attempted to enforce ordinances 
prohibiting or limiting such rentals. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 128–29. 
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itself—i.e., the continuing invention of new digital marketplaces.381 
The dynamic nature of innovation poses particular challenges for 
government in terms of identifying trends, determining regulatory 
needs, and designing suitable responses. Prohibitions or restrictions 
targeting a particular platform might be readily circumvented by the 
creation of alternative platforms offering a similar service.382 
Nonetheless, the digital nature of these marketplaces renders them 
traceable, and the efforts of these marketplaces to attract users will 
likely make them visible to regulators as well. 
2.  A Governance Role for Nongovernmental Intermediaries 
Governance of the shared economy is not limited to the Big 
Data/Big Government approach. Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit, and 
other platform companies are emerging as key regulatory 
intermediaries.383 In the sharing economy, platform companies offer 
“access to the software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system 
of reputation and trust between their users.”384 These companies can 
react more quickly than public regulators to new developments in the 
sharing economy.385 Moreover, because of the market power that 
various platforms have gained through their extensive networks,386 
platform companies often have substantial authority and the ability to 
set and enforce standards.387 
As already noted, government may impose mandates on 
platforms in order to regulate distributed-innovation activity 
indirectly.388 Yet platform companies may exercise a governance 
function even in the absence of public mandates. Platform companies 
are private, economically-motivated actors whose self-interests may 
prompt them to address certain aspects of market failures.389 In 
addition, platform companies may be subject to pressure from angel 
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investors and venture capitalists to adhere to specific rules or 
requirements as a condition of continued funding.390 
Platform companies commonly reduce information asymmetries 
through online feedback systems, background checks, and screening 
of service providers.391 They often address risks to users by offering 
money-back guarantees or liability insurance coverage.392 And leery 
of public opposition or government regulation, platform companies 
may adopt measures to diminish the negative externalities associated 
with their users’ activities. TaskRabbit has instituted a sitewide 
minimum wage,393 for example, and Airbnb has created a hotline on 
its website for neighbors of Airbnb hosts.394 
Reputations established through online feedback are a 
particularly prominent mechanism for governance in the sharing 
economy. Reputation systems improve market functioning by 
increasing the quality and quantity of information on which market 
participants base their decisions.395 Providers are unlikely to attract 
business if their ratings are adverse, and users who develop a negative 
reputation may be excluded from subsequent transactions. Ratings 
systems provide information in a “real-time and dynamic” manner 
and “functionally substitute personal trust and regulated 
standards.”396 These systems, however, are not perfect. They can be 
subject to bias, manipulation, and falsification, and feedback 
mechanisms may magnify the effect of a few initial reviews, whether 
accurate or not.397 
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Notwithstanding their power and their central role in the sharing 
economy, platform companies cannot be expected to perform all 
desired governance functions. Platforms are ultimately private 
economic entities that may not adequately consider the interests of 
the public or of other stakeholders.398 In some contexts, other 
nongovernmental entities—such as homeowners associations in the 
instance of short-term rentals, or associations of drivers in the case of 
Uber—may step in to represent other interests.399 
Governance through platform companies may lack transparency, 
whether such governance involves government regulation or self-
regulation.400 In either case, the precise nature of a regulation, as well 
its source, may be obscured from users and the public. Users may not 
even be aware that their behavior is being regulated thanks to the 
subtlety with which a platform’s software operates—whether in the 
form of matching algorithms, filters, or other features.401 Lack of 
accountability is also a concern, as governance by platform companies 
may not allow for public participation or user input, and their 
decisions are not subject to democratic processes or judicial review.402 
3.  Self-Regulation 
Online reputation systems, though usually mediated by platform 
companies, rely on the input of platform users.403 These systems thus 
constitute a form of self-regulation, particularly when platforms make 
users’ feedback directly available to other users and potential users. 
Users’ cumulative feedback—and even the potential to receive a 
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negative review—can serve as incentives for good behavior, 
particularly with respect to repeat players.404 
Indeed, the ongoing development of decentralized online 
marketplaces offers the prospect of peer-to-peer transactions 
occurring without a digital platform company serving as an 
intermediary.405 These marketplaces are built upon blockchain 
technology, which relies on “a shared, trusted, public ledger that 
everyone can inspect, but which no single user controls” to keep track 
of transactions without a central oversight institution.406 A sharing 
economy without middlemen would lack one of the more effective 
levers for government oversight and raise new challenges for 
governance.407 Such a system would have a self-regulatory aspect in 
that users and coders would set the rules and help ensure the integrity 
of transactions.408 It is not clear, however, that broader societal 
interests would be protected.409 Government involvement in creating 
the computer code that underlies decentralized online marketplaces 
could provide a means of exerting influence and protecting the public 
interest.410 
The sharing economy is already witnessing a combination of 
governance approaches that incorporate Big Data/Big Government, 
nongovernmental intermediaries, and self-regulation. Current 
approaches must continue to evolve in order to keep up with new 
developments and concerns. 
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CONCLUSION 
Characterized by new activities occurring outside established 
organizational arrangements, distributed innovation challenges 
traditional structures of management and authority. Distributed 
innovation fits poorly within existing legal categories, avoids ready 
detection, and metamorphoses into new forms. Experience in 
governing the conduct of individuals and small pollution sources, 
however, suggests possible means to influence distributed innovation 
in pursuit of public goals. Recognizing the challenge as one of 
governance, and not simply regulation, enables the recruitment of 
businesses, nonprofit organizations, and innovators themselves for 
managing the risks. 
Given the various forms and contexts in which distributed 
innovation arises, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the 
challenges it presents. Nor is any single governance tool likely to 
suffice within a particular context. The Big Data/Big Government 
approach is a tempting response to fears of catastrophic harm or 
misuse. Yet it cannot eliminate all risk, and it often comes at a high 
cost to the public fisc and to autonomy and privacy interests. 
Nongovernmental intermediaries can be an effective locus for 
government regulation, and in some instances they may develop their 
own measures to govern distributed innovators directly. Yet 
intermediaries may fail to account for relevant public concerns, and 
the legitimacy of their actions are open to question. Self-regulation 
offers a promising response to the practical difficulties distributed 
innovation poses for conventional regulation. At the same time, 
private interests are especially likely to predominate, and lack of 
legitimacy is of particular concern. Each of these approaches, 
however imperfect, may provide a valuable contribution to managing 
the risks of distributed innovation when used in concert with the 
others. Because distributed innovation takes different forms and is 
constantly adapting, the approaches utilized in its governance must 
also be flexible and adaptive. Governance of distributed innovation, it 
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